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Preface 
On behalf of a group of development partners (DPs), the Swedish Embassy in Dar es Salaam 
commissioned the Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) and Senior Researcher Dr Inge Amundsen to 
undertake this analysis on support to parliaments. The Terms of Reference (ToR, attached) defined 
the assignment as a comparative analysis on support to parliaments with a special focus on the 
future options for support in Tanzania, and as a desk study with one fieldwork in Tanzania (Dar es 
Salaam, Zanzibar, and Dodoma) in June 2010.  
 We would like to thank all respondents for providing us with information, both the people 
we have interviewed face-to-face in Tanzania and by phone and e-mail. In particular, various people 
of the Bunge in Dodoma and the House of Representatives in Zanzibar were very helpful during the 
fieldwork in early June 2010. Their insights and advice have been invaluable. We would also like to 
thank the Swedish Embassy in Dar es Salaam for practical assistance, information, and advice. 
Thanks also to Dr Arne Tostensen at CMI for proofreading and very useful comments. 
 Information on politics and the parliaments in Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya and Zambia is 
drawn from various sources. When none is cited, the basic source has been a combination of the 
country pages of Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page), BBC World 
(www.bbc.co.uk/news/world/africa/) and the US Department of State Human Rights Reports 
(www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/index.htm). 
 The usual disclaimer applies; this report does not reflect the policies or views of the 
Swedish Embassy, Sida, or any particular donor. The opinions expressed are those of the author 
alone.  
 
 
 
Bergen, September 2010 
 
 
 
Inge Amundsen  
Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) 
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Executive Summary 
1. The legislature epitomises the very idea of democracy, and a strong parliament is indicative of a 
healthy democracy and a good governance system. Parliaments perform three core functions: 
(a) representing the electorate; (b) lawmaking (including budget making); and (c) oversight of 
the executive branch of government (‘checks and balances’).  
2. In most developing countries, executive (presidential) powers tend to be preponderant and 
parliaments tend to be weak. In Africa in particular, presidential domination is a major 
governance problem, and for democratic developments and processes to take place, a further 
strengthening of the parliament (and the judiciary) is crucial. 
3. Kenya is a democratic multi-party republic with a presidential system of government. The 
ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU) was the only legal political party until the early 
1990s when civil unrest and international pressure led to the restoration of multi-party politics. 
The opposition was able to end nearly 40 years of KANU rule with Kibaki and the National 
Rainbow Coalition (NARC)’s landslide victory in the 2002 general elections. 
4. Kenyan elections have been flawed and far below international standards. People have been 
killed and displaced. There has been a long-lasting top-level political rivalry between President 
Kibaki and the opposition leader Odinga, who is now the Prime Minister in a grand coalition 
government.  
5. The National Assembly of Kenya has seen significant developments. On the positive side, it has 
increased its financial independence and pursued allegations of corruption and financial 
mismanagement in several well-known financial scandals. The committees have become more 
active and the number of major bills passed has increased. The conflict between President 
Kibaki and Prime Minister Odinga has nevertheless paralysed much parliamentary work.  
6. The USAID has been supporting the National Assembly in Kenya since 2000 through a project 
executed by SUNY/CID, and later also in partnership with DFID. The USAID/DFID-led 
programme has led to the implementation of new House Rules that have inter alia opened up 
committee hearings to the public and increased the parliament’s watchdog muscle. Live TV and 
radio broadcast of plenary debates has also increased the transparency of parliamentary 
proceedings.  
7. With the new Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy (KJAS), a larger number of donors have joined 
forces for the period 2009-2013. The group has formed the Democratic Governance Donor 
Group (DGDG). 
8. One lesson from Kenya is the importance of good working relations between the National 
Assembly and civil society. There now exists in a Kenya a vibrant parliament-focused civil 
society and a private sector community that have been providing policy analyses and support 
for legislative work. 
9. Uganda is formally a democracy, but the president, the military and the ruling party sturdily 
dominate this polity, with overt tendencies of clientelism, nepotism, and militarism. The 
country has not had a peaceful, constitutional transfer of power since independence in 1962. 
Uganda returned to multiparty politics only after a referendum in 2005.  
10. The first multi-party elections after formal democratisation were the parliamentary and 
presidential elections in 2006. These were marred by politically motivated violence and bribery 
of voters. The second general elections – presidential, national assembly and local – will take 
place in February-March 2011. There are no limits on presidential terms, and President 
Museveni will most probably remain in power for many more years.  
CMI REPORT DONOR SUPPORT TO PARLIAMENTS – TANZANIA AND BEYOND R 2010:8 
 ix
11. The Parliament of Uganda is only in its first multi-party period (2006-2011). Museveni’s 
National Resistance Movement (NRM) has an absolute majority and enough to ensure a two-
thirds majority to change the constitution. The parliament’s ability to exercise its functions 
effectively is hindered by the dominance of the executive and a system of patronage.  
12. Even when the Parliament of Uganda is relatively well equipped in terms of formal, 
constitutional powers and institutional capacity, it remains to exercise these powers and tasks in 
full. Parliament has taken some steps backwards recently. However, a number of parliamentary 
institutions have been established (e.g. parliamentary commissions, the Parliamentary Service 
and the Parliamentary Budget Office).  
13. Parliamentary support has lately been done through a joint donor basket fund of the Deepening 
Democracy Programme (DDP) in Uganda. The programme is co-ordinated by an independent 
programme management unit, HUGGO, hosted by Danida. Donor efforts have largely shifted 
from infrastructure and institutional development to the demand side and the opposition. 
14. The DDP has been politically bold, relevant, flexible, and ‘contextualized’ in that the 
parliamentary support component has been geared to oversight committees and has worked to 
strengthen two newly established opposition institutions: the Shadow Cabinet and the Leader of 
the Opposition. The programme supports this through an Expert Advisory Fund for Committees 
and a Shadow Cabinet Research Fund.  
15. A particular dilemma to the donors in Uganda is that so much has gone right in terms of 
economic development, but a lot is going wrong in politics. Poverty levels are going down, 
economic growth is considerable, but Museveni has become more ruthless and authoritarian. 
Can democracy be shoved aside in the battle against poverty? 
16. Zambia enacted a new constitution in 1991, in response to growing popular demand for multi-
party democracy, and the first multi-party elections for parliament and the presidency since the 
1960s were held in October 1991. The opposition party Movement for Multiparty Democracy 
(MMD) and its candidate Frederick Chiluba won the elections.  
17. In 2001, supporters of President Chiluba mounted a campaign to amend the constitution to 
enable Chiluba to seek a third term of office. However, civil society, opposition parties, and 
members of the ruling party complemented widespread popular opposition that forced Chiluba 
to back down. 
18. In the presidential elections of 2001, the MMD presidential candidate Levy Mwanawasa won 
by a narrow margin. In the 2006 hotly contested elections, Mwanawasa was re-elected by a 
clear margin over the principal challengers Patriotic Front (PF) and the United Party for 
National Development (UPND). In mid-2008, Mwanawasa died in office, and Vice President 
Rupiah Banda succeeded him. The next general elections – presidential, national assembly and 
local elections – should take place before October 2011. 
19. The unicameral National Assembly of Zambia is the country’s legislative body, based on the 
Westminster model. However, the president has far-reaching decision-making authority, which 
includes making key public appointments in the Zambian state and veto powers over decisions 
by parliament. Furthermore, opposition members complain about the dominance of the Speaker 
and the ruling party in selecting committee members, and that they are not actively involved in 
planning and setting priorities. 
20. In Zambia, parliamentary support has been given through a multi-donor Parliamentary Reform 
Programme (PRP) since 2002. The first phase of the PRP (2001-2003) was mainly a 
preparatory phase. The second phase (2003-2007) was supported by the United States, 
Denmark, Sweden, Ireland, and the Netherlands. The third phase (2008-2011) involves DFID, 
the EU, Irish Aid and the UNDP, with an overall volume of approximately USD 9 million. 
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21. Among the results achieved so far is an increase in the number of people who have access to 
MPs, in the number of visitors to parliament, the public is able to follow the proceedings in the 
house, and constituency offices have been established, staffed and equipped. 
22. Donor coordination is considered good in Zambia, largely because of the Joint Assistance 
Strategy for Zambia (JASZ) with twelve bilateral donors, international financing institutions, 
the European Commission and the United Nations. Under the JASZ, donors also coordinate 
regularly with the government.  
23. One lesson from Zambia is the usefulness of both a national and an international advisor in the 
early phases of the parliamentary reform effort. This provided different perspectives and 
facilitated discussion of what was desirable and feasible. Another lesson is that a reform 
commitment from the Speaker is a necessary pre-condition. Besides, Standing Orders revisions 
can serve as benchmarks and triggers to assure that the more difficult reforms are implemented, 
and that constituency offices may serve as a carrot to encourage internal reforms. Civil society 
must be involved by providing feedback on an annual basis. 
24. One context issue is problematic in Zambia: parliament is becoming increasingly bloated. 
Donor funding has helped spark a proposal to increase the number of MPs from 150 to 280. 
With salaries, allowances, utilities and perks, the cost increases are substantial. Besides, it will 
further encourage and enable MPs to get involved in the implementation of development 
projects, with may lead to further pressures of clientelism, favouritism, and corruption.  
25. This comparison demonstrates that current political issues profoundly affect parliamentary 
strengthening. Assistance requires flexible approaches, perceptive analyses, and continuous 
adjustments. In particular, when the basic parliamentary infrastructure and organisation is 
established (offices, commissions, administrative services, etc.), it is time to turn attention to 
policy issues like transparency, accountability, and the ‘watchdog’ functions of parliament.  
26. Tanzania embarked on a democratisation process in the early 1990s, after 30 years of one-party 
socialist rule. The 1995 elections were the real constituent democratic presidential and 
parliamentary elections, which (re-)established the ruling party CCM as Tanzania’s dominant 
party. The 2000 and 2005 elections only confirmed and fortified its dominance. 
27. Three factors can become potential counter-balancing measures in Tanzania and create some 
checks and balances to the dominant CCM government and president, namely the federal 
system with a semi-autonomous Zanzibar, a vitalised Union Parliament, and the judiciary.  
28. Since 2005, Tanzania’s Union Parliament (Bunge) has increasingly exercised its oversight role 
despite the increasing dominance of the incumbent CCM. It has become more open to 
opposition voices and its legitimacy and corporate self-esteem is on the rise. The number of 
hearings and questions has increased, the oversight committees are working better, and we have 
seen ad hoc committees of scrutiny and investigation. 
29. Two challenges are particularly important when considering support for the Union Parliament. 
One is the increasing dominance of the ruling party, which calls for support for the opposition 
in Tanzania. The second is that Tanzania might become an oil exporter and that corruption 
pressures will intensify. This calls for specific measures to prevent the oil curse, in particular a 
good parliamentary budget process, and strong oversight and control mechanisms. 
30. However, some observers have argued that the Union Parliament is sufficiently funded and 
equipped in technical terms, so that the donors should concentrate on the next phase: to ensure 
transparency, accountability, and checks and balances. 
31. Thus, the DPs should consider rendering some support specifically earmarked for the 
opposition in the Union Parliament. This can be done by extending support (financial and/or 
technical) to the Leader of the Opposition, and to the Shadow Government, for instance through 
the same mechanism as in Uganda – a Shadow Cabinet Research Fund, or as direct support to 
the Office of the Leader of the Opposition. 
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32. Secondly, the parliamentary committees of oversight, scrutiny and control are important and 
should be supported. In particular, the oversight and legislative functions (passing of laws and 
the budget) need strengthening. In the Union Parliament, these include the Public Accounts and 
Public Corporation Accounts committees, but should also include other oversight committees.  
33. A support programme could work directly with the committee members and support staff, to 
enhance their understanding of current issues through knowledge transfer, capacity building, 
and training. The DPs can support evolving committee secretariats, support research and 
committee management skills development, assist the committees with research and 
assessment, and assist in the establishment of committee hearings and public forums. 
34. One possible vehicle for committee support would be to establish a fund based on the Ugandan 
model, where the donors have institutionalised an Expert Advisory Fund for Committees. 
Besides, there should be a steering committee comprising a variety of interests represented in 
parliament, together with donor agency representatives and preferably also the presence of 
relevant government agencies (Auditor General) and some NGOs and CSOs. 
35. The opposition in Zanzibar can be reached only indirectly. With the recent referendum and the 
union government that will follow, the opposition in the Zanzibar House of Representatives 
(HRZ) will be reduced to zero. Nevertheless, the oversight and scrutiny committees should be 
supported. However, support for the opposition in the Union parliament becomes even more 
important. 
36. Besides, the House of Representatives in Zanzibar is in need for further infrastructure 
improvement and increased human capacity, both for the support staff and for the elected 
representatives.  
37. On the recipient side in Tanzania, there may be a need to strengthen ‘recipient capabilities’, as 
we have seen was the case in Uganda with the Parliamentary Development and Coordination 
Office. 
38. On the donor side in Tanzania, there have been problems with SUNY/CID, and the organisation 
is still regarded with some scepticism. However, the use of academic institutions or consultancy 
firms can move parliamentary strengthening programmes beyond the traditional approach, in 
particular when the USAID is a strong lead donor. However, it is not probable that the USAID 
can (and will) play the same pro-active political role in Tanzania as it did in Uganda and Kenya. 
39. Thus, the UNDP stands out as the organisation to administer, manage and implement multi-
donor parliamentary strengthening programmes in Tanzania. Although it may lack ‘political 
clout’ and be slow and bureaucratic, the UNDP cannot be suspected of pursuing any particular 
national or political interest. Besides, it has a particularly long history of parliamentary support 
and a competent and experienced home office staff, and it enjoys great esteem among 
institutions and officials in Tanzania. 
40. For the sake of credibility and long-term commitment, legitimacy and ownership, the DPs 
should maintain part of their support for the parliament in Tanzania through the UNDP. That is, 
the UNDP can and should be maintained as a project administrator and implementer primarily 
for the long-term, recipient-led infrastructure developments (as set out in the corporate plans) 
and basic skills enhancement (the Sisyphean task). This is particularly relevant for the Zanzibar 
House of Representatives. 
41. However, with the reorganisation of the UN mission activities in Tanzania into a new and pilot 
“One UN”, the DPs will have to follow the UNDP closely, and make the conditions that the 
UNDP provides staff with competence and skills on parliamentary support and programme 
management, including financial management. 
42. In addition, the DPs should develop forms of support more specifically targeted at parliament’s 
political roles. The DPs in Tanzania should opt for a more flexible and directly donor-led 
approach for the politically sensitive issues like strengthening the opposition and enhancing the 
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budget process. These sensitive issues will need more direct dialogue, more flexibility to adapt 
to changing political circumstances, and sometimes more ‘leverage’ exercised by the DPs in 
concert with their diplomatic personnel.  
43. Some propositions for this political support has been mentioned above: to establish a Shadow 
Cabinet Research Fund to support the Office of the Leader of the Opposition and other 
mechanisms for direct, targeted support for the opposition, an Expert Advisory Fund for 
Committees and other oversight and ad hoc scrutiny committees, and a Parliamentary Budget 
Office. All this will have to be done in concert with different stakeholders and in alliances with 
the media, CSOs, NGOs, government agencies, research institutes, etc. 
44. Lastly, also the electoral system, the electoral process, and the functioning of the political 
parties affect the strength of the opposition. Thus, the components of the DDTP programme on 
the political parties and the electoral process becomes an integrated part of parliamentary 
strengthening. 
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 1
1. The Parliament of Tanzania 
1.1 Introduction 
As a political institution, parliament is the epitome of the idea of democracy, and a strong 
parliament is usually indicative of a healthy democratic and good governance system. Parliaments 
come in different shapes and with different strengths (and with different names; parliament, national 
assembly, legislature, house of representatives, and congress1). Besides, parliaments perform three 
core functions. They represent the electorate, they make the laws (including the state budget), and 
they oversee the executive branch of government. The latter, the ‘checks and balances’ function, is 
embedded in the balance of powers between the three branches of government: executive, 
legislative and judicial. 
 In most developing countries, executive (presidential) powers tend to be preponderant and 
parliaments tend to be weak. In Africa in particular, presidential domination was the norm for many 
years after military and one-party governments were established shortly after independence. After 
the opening up of the political landscape in the early 1990s (the so-called “third wave of 
democracy”), parliaments gained much independence and power. Today, some parliaments in 
Africa are in the process of increasing their authority further, but others are not. Anyway, 
presidentialism is known as one of the main obstacles to democratic change and consolidation in 
Africa. For democratic developments and processes to take place, a further strengthening of the 
parliament (and the judiciary) is crucial. 
 This report presents a short analysis of the Parliament of Tanzania (which includes the 
Bunge in Dodoma and the House of Representatives in Zanzibar), which has only recently taken up 
its ‘checks and balances’ functions. The report then presents an outline of donor assistance to the 
Tanzanian parliament, and an outline of the modalities of donor support to the parliaments of 
Zambia, Kenya, and Uganda, in order to compare and contrast the strengths and weaknesses of the 
different modalities of multi-donor parliament support. Based on some general lessons, on a 
description of the Tanzanian parliament, and the comparative/contrasting cases of Zambia, Kenya, 
and Uganda, the report concludes on a set of recommendations for the development partners in 
Tanzania for future multi-donor funding of the Tanzanian Parliament.  
1.2 Political Background 
The United Republic of Tanzania is a multiparty republic consisting of the mainland and the 
Zanzibar archipelago.2 The President of the Republic is the head of government and the head of the 
Union, at the same time as Zanzibar exercises considerable autonomy with its own President (who 
is the Vice President of the United Republic) and a separate parliament and court system. 
                                                     
1 The terms may have specific meanings in the academic literature. For instance, the legislature and the legislative branch 
are the generic and academic terms. In parliamentary systems, parliament is the preferred term because it has exclusive 
law-making powers and the powers to select, elect and dismiss governments. The term parliament is embedded in the 
British tradition. In presidential and hybrid systems, the term national assembly and congress is the preferred terms 
because here the government/cabinet is (usually) not nominated from within the legislative branch, and is not dependent 
on the confidence of a parliamentary majority. The term national assembly is embedded in the French and American 
tradition. However, just as the actual powers can differ and merge, the terminology is notoriously imprecise. In this report, 
we will use the term legislative branch and legislature at the theoretic and comparative level, and parliament at the 
national level (and Parliament or National Assembly when specific national legislatures are named so). 
2 The Zanzibar archipelago consists of the two islands of Unguja and Pemba and a number of small islets (a third island, 
Mafia, falls under the mainland administratively). Zanzibar has just above 1 million inhabitants, whereas the mainland has 
an estimated 44 million. 
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 British rule ended in 1961 after a relatively peaceful transition to independence. Julius 
Nyerere became the first Prime Minister of Tanganyika, and his Tanganyika African National 
Union (TANU) became the leading political organisation in the country. In 1964 the Sultanate of 
Zanzibar was overthrown in a violent, left-wing revolution, and Tanganyika and Zanzibar merged to 
become the United Republic of Tanzania. 
 Soon after independence, Nyerere took a marked political turn to the left and to Pan-African 
socialism, with nationalisations and collectivisation (Ujamaa).3 Furthermore, in line with 
communist style government, the socialist party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM, Revolutionary 
Party) was made the only legal party. It was established in 1977 with the merger of Nyerere’s 
Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) on the mainland and Abeid Amani Karume’s 
revolutionary Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) on Zanzibar. In addition, the press came under government 
control and the parliament, judiciary, and all other state institutions became subjected to the 
‘guidance’ of the CCM.  
 After 30 years of one-party socialist rule, Tanzania embarked on a democratisation process 
in the early 1990s, along with a large number of other African countries. The constitution was 
amended in 1992 to allow for multi-partyism, and the first-ever multiparty elections in Tanzania 
were two parliamentary by-elections (won by the CCM) in early 1994. The 1995 elections were, 
however, the real constituent democratic presidential and parliamentary elections, which (re-) 
established the ruling party CCM as Tanzania’s dominant party. The CCM won 62 per cent of the 
votes for its presidential candidate Benjamin W. Mkapa, and 186 of the 232 elected seats (80 per 
cent) of the Union Parliament. 
 The 2000 and 2005 elections only confirmed and fortified this trend. The CCM candidate, 
President Mkapa, was re-elected with 72 per cent of the vote in 2000, and its presidential candidate 
Jakaya Kikwete won 80 per cent of the votes in 2005 and became the current president. In 2000, the 
CCM won 202 of the 231 elected seats (87 per cent) of the Union Parliament, and in 2005, the CCM 
won 206 of the 232 elected seats (89 per cent).4 Observers considered the 2005 mainland elections 
to be free and fair, although marked by violence in some regions. 
 In sum, the CCM has maintained its stronghold on Tanzanian politics. Goran Hyden 
recapitulates the political history in this way:  
 
If the Nyerere years was a blind race toward a false paradise and the Mwinyi period 
was a chaotic free-for-all dance in the rediscovered market place, the past ten years 
under the country’s third president [Mkapa] has been an attempt to a more 
disciplined march toward specific policy goals (Hyden 2005:12).  
 
 The situation in Zanzibar is different, however. Here, political contestation has increased 
between the ruling CCM and the opposition, and all multi-party elections have been marred by vote 
rigging and violence. The political violence following the 2000 elections claimed at least 23 lives, 
and the 2005 elections were also highly contentious with serious irregularities and politically 
motivated violence. Over the years, in Zanzibar (and mainly on Pemba island), houses and schools 
have been burnt and water wells contaminated by followers of one party bent on making life 
difficult for the followers of the other party. 
                                                     
3 Ujamaa comes from the Swahili word for extended family or familyhood. Based on the Arusha Declaration of 1967, the 
government transferred people to new collective farms by giving them promises that later turned out to be empty. Others 
were forced, armed police and military were used in population transfers, and villages were burnt. The economy collapsed 
and most of the population was close to starving to death. The nation survived only on foreign food. Ujamaa was 
dismantled when Ali Hassan Mwinyi came to power to in 1985. 
4 In addition to the elected seats, there are (from 2005) 75 additional women seats, 10 seats nominated by the president, 5 
seats for representatives of the House of Representatives (Zanzibar) and one ex officio member. This further increases the 
CCM domination of the parliament (to 275 of the 323 seats in total). 
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 In Zanzibar, the CCM has faced significant opposition from the Chama Cha Wananchi 
(CUF, Civic United Front) party.5 In the 2000 elections, the CUF presidential candidate won 33 per 
cent of the votes and the party 16 of the 50 seats in the House of Representatives, and another 16 
per cent for its union presidential candidate and 17 of 231 elective seats for the Union Parliament. 
This established CUF as a strong rival to power in Zanzibar and the biggest opposition party in 
national politics. 
 In 2005, the CUF presidential candidate won 46 per cent of the vote and the party gained 19 
seats in the House of Representatives, making CUF an even stronger opposition party and a real 
power alternative to the CCM in Zanzibar. Furthermore, in the national elections, the CUF 
presidential candidate gained 12 per cent of the votes and 19 directly elected seats (and 30 seats 
altogether) in the Union Parliament, confirming CUF as the leading opposition party in Tanzania.6  
 With a reconciliation process and direct talks between the contestants in Zanzibar (President 
Amani Abeid Karume of CCM Zanzibar and Secretary General Seif Sharif Hamad of CUF) in 
2009, the situation has calmed down and stabilised. As a part of this process, Zanzibar held a 
referendum in June 2010 to decide whether there should be a government of national unity in 
Zanzibar.7 In the referendum, two-thirds (66.4 per cent) of the voters favoured the constitutional 
changes that will pave the way for a unity government later this year, whereas one-third voted 
against (33.6 per cent) (Daily Nation 4 August 2010). This power-sharing deal will effectively 
counteract all CUF opposition in the House of Representatives, and remove CUF as an opposition 
force in Zanzibar (and opposition politics as such, at least for a good while). 
 The political system of Tanzania is formally democratic, with the union president and 
members of parliament elected concurrently by direct popular vote for five-year terms.8 The system 
is nevertheless strongly presidential. The union president is the head of state as well as head of 
government, and he appoints the cabinet ministers, of which one holds the title of Prime Minister. 
Besides, the constitution allows the president to nominate up to ten members of parliament.9  
 The constitutional centralisation of power in the hands of the president is reinforced by the 
dominant role of the ruling party. The union president is also president of the ruling party CCM, and 
with the CCM holding absolute majority in parliament the CCM can alone make constitutional 
amendments and pass other legislation that require two-thirds majority. Furthermore, the 
constitution does not allow for coalitions of parties or for independent candidates, which is an 
additional factor that explains the dominance of the ruling party and the presidency. 
Three factors can nevertheless become potential counter-balancing measures and create 
some checks and balances to the dominant CCM central government and presidency. 
The first is the federal system of government, with a semi-autonomous Zanzibar. Although 
the ruling party of Zanzibar (the Afro-Shirazi Party) was absorbed into a united CCM in 1977, 
which neutralised this party as an impending counter-force, the existence of a separate government 
is still important. The so-called Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, with its Revolutionary 
Council (cabinet) and House of Representatives (parliament) is a possible and latent counter-force 
to the dominance of the union president and the central government. Some currents of independent 
political life on Zanzibar has been discernible over the last years, although the central government 
keeps a close watch on the island and quickly defuses most attempts of real Zanzibar autonomy.10  
                                                     
5 CUF is a liberal party formed in 1992 through a merger of Kamahuru, a pressure group for democratisation in Zanzibar, 
and the Civic Movement, a human rights organisation based on the mainland. Many CUF leaders were former CCM 
members who had been expelled over disputes about party and government policy. 
6 In addition to CUF, there is the Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CDM, Party for Democracy and Progress), a 
conservative party with 5 directly elected seats in the National Assembly, and two very small parties with one seat each. 
7 A government of national unity is a power-sharing deal that will include CUF members in the Zanzibari government. 
There will be one president and two vice-presidents; one from the party which comes second in the polls and the second 
from the winning party. Ministries will be allocated on a proportional basis. 
8 A presidential candidate needs only a plurality to win; there is no run-off election if the winning candidate does not 
garner more than 50 per cent of the vote. 
9 According to Section 11, Act 3; Constitution of 2001.  
10 It is in this context the 31 July 2010 Zanzibar referendum should be seen, rather than as a ’peace process’. 
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The second potential counter-force to check and balance the dominant CCM central 
government is the Union Parliament. Although the opposition is very weak, with only 26 seats (19 
for CUF and 7 for other – i.e. mainland – opposition parties), parliament was revalorised with the 
constitutional amendments of 1992, and it is increasingly asserting its constitutional powers.  
In particular, since 2005, Tanzania’s Union Parliament has increasingly exercised its oversight role, 
although it remains generally respectful of executive authority. Parliament has been more open to 
opposition voices and its legitimacy and corporate self-esteem is on the rise. Particularly interesting 
is the fact that opposition members of the parliament chair the four committees that oversee public 
accounts.11 
The third institution of checks and balances is the judiciary. Tanzania’s judiciary has 
displayed signs of autonomy after decades of subservience to the one-party CCM regime. The 
Tanzanian constitution guarantees judicial independence, and judicial review exists. Judges are 
appropriately trained, appointed by the president in consultation with an independent Judicial 
Service Commission, have secure tenure until retirement at age 60, and are promoted and dismissed 
in a fair and unbiased manner. This gives the higher-level courts considerable independence 
(Freedom House 2010:13). However, the judiciary remains under-funded, corrupt, inefficient, and 
subject to executive influence, especially in the lower courts (US State Department 2010). 
1.3 The Bunge and the House of Representatives 
The Parliament of Tanzania has two branches. One is the union Bunge la Tanzania/Parliament of 
Tanzania in Dodoma (usually referred to as the Union Parliament or the Bunge); the other is the 
Baraza la Wawakilishi in Zanzibar (usually referred to as the House of Representatives).12 The 
Union Parliament has the responsibilities of all union matters, including defence and finance and all 
matters relating to the mainland,13 whereas the semi-autonomous House of Representatives has the 
responsibility for all domestic Zanzibari affairs. 
 Despite its history as a subservient, ‘yeah-saying’ institution (functioning more as a home 
for regime and party dignitaries in need of status and position, legitimising whatever was the 
decisions of the party and presidency), the Parliament of Tanzania had its constitutional powers 
increased significantly with the constitutional amendments of 1992. Although parliament has seen 
an increasing dominance of CCM representatives in subsequent elections, it has also gained 
considerable independence and corporate self-esteem over the years, and its legitimacy is on the 
rise.  
1.3.1 Dodoma: The Union Parliament 
In February 1996, the Union Parliament moved from Dar es Salaam to Dodoma, which officially 
became the capital of Tanzania. However, government ministries, the presidency and the 
headquarters of the main public companies are still located in Dar es Salaam, as well as a number of 
                                                     
11 These are the committees of Public Accounts (UDP), Public Corporations Accounts (CHADEMA), and Local 
Government Accounts (CHADEMA). See: www.parliament.go.tz/bunge/committee.php?cat=3&subcat=18. It is not 
unusual in Westminster model parliaments, however, that the chairs of oversight committees are drawn from the 
opposition (as is the case also in Kenya). 
12 Actually, according to the Tanzanian constitution, the parliament has three branches: the two national assemblies plus 
the presidency. (“There shall be a Parliament of the United Republic which shall consist of two parts, that is to say, the 
President and the National Assembly”, Tanzania Constitution, Article 62 [1]). This formulation dates back to the single-
party socialist area, when there was no separation of powers, and is still seen for instance in the corporate plan for the 
‘National Assembly’ issued by the ‘Parliament of Tanzania’. This somewhat confusing terminology stems from the fact 
that Tanzania is a presidential system with elements from the British parliamentary tradition in which all 
government/cabinet ministers have to be elected members of parliament. 
13 The Constitution (First Schedule) lists 22 items that are exclusive Union matters (as the basis of the division of powers 
between the Union and Zanzibar). In general these are matters that are usually reserved to the central government of a 
federation such as defence, currency, foreign affairs, etc.  
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parliament offices, turning it into the unofficial political capital besides being the economic centre 
of the country. Committee meetings usually take place here, but the periodic movement of MPs, 
secretarial staff and others for the parliamentary sessions in Dodoma four times a year is quite an 
event in terms of planning, logistics, transportation, and media coverage (and indeed a costly one).  
 The unicameral Parliament has 323 members (since 2005), up from 269 in 1995 and 295 in 
2000. Of these members, 232 are elected by direct popular vote in single-member constituencies (on 
the mainland and in Zanzibar) using the first-past-the-post system. In addition, there are 75 
additional Women Special Seats (elected by their political parties based on the parties’ 
representational strength in parliament) plus 5 seats for members of the Zanzibar House of 
Representatives (elected indirectly by the House). Finally, there are up to 10 seats for people 
nominated by the union President (members who can also serve in the Cabinet), and one seat 
reserved for the Attorney General ex officio.14  
 In the current (outgoing) assembly,15 the ruling party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) holds 
206 directly elected seats and 275 seats when including special seats, which is an absolute majority 
of about 85 per cent. The biggest opposition parties are the Chama Cha Wananchi (CCW or CUF, 
Civic United Front) with 19/31 seats16 (9 per cent) and the Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo 
(CHADEMA) with 5/11 seats (3 per cent). Besides, the Tanzania Labour Party (TLP) and the 
United Democratic Party (UDP) are represented with one deputy each.17  
3.1.2 Zanzibar: House of Representatives 
The Zanzibar House of Representatives (HRZ) was created in 1980. Before this date, the so-called 
Revolutionary Government had exercised both executive and legislative powers since the revolution 
in 1964. The House is a product of the 1979 Zanzibar Constitution, and is mandated by the revised, 
current constitution of 1984. Besides, the HRZ is recognised by the 1977 constitution of the United 
Republic of Tanzania. 
 The House has 82 members, including the elected, nominated and ex officio members. Of 
these, 50 members are elected in direct ‘winner-takes-all’ elections, 10 members are appointed by 
the President of Zanzibar (and at least two of them must come from the opposition), 15 special seats 
for women from political parties represented in the House (distributed proportionally), and 6 ex-
officio members (5 Regional Commissioners and the Attorney General).18 Like with the union 
government, all ministers of the Zanzibar Government, including the Chief Minister (Prime 
Minister), are drawn from the elected members of the HRZ. 
  In the current assembly, the ruling party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) holds 30 of the 50 
directly elected seats, and the Civic United Front (CUF) holds 19 seats.19 No other party gained 
representation in Zanzibar.20 In contrast to the mainland, politics in Zanzibar is highly competitive, 
dividing the HRZ in two almost equal camps. The 1995 elections results were 26:24 and the 2000 
results were 34:16. With the current 2005 distribution being 30:20 (plus very close presidential 
races in 1995 and 2005), the opposition has maintained its strength in Zanzibar and is playing a very 
visible role in the HRZ.  
                                                     
14 Source: National Electoral Commission website (www.nec.go.tz/?modules=esystem&sub). 
15 The five-year term of the Ninth Parliament came to an end on 16 July 2010. The tenth Parliament (as well as the 
President) will be elected in general elections on 31 October 2010. 
16 19 directly elected seats and 31 when including additional seats. 
17 Sources: African Elections Database website (http://africanelections.tripod.com/tz.html) and Adam Carr’s Electoral 
Archives (http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/t/tanzania/statstanzania.shtml). 
18 Source: House of Representatives website (www.zanzibarassembly.go.tz/about_us/composition.php). 
19 The last seat was nullified by the electoral commission. A re-run was held on 14 December 2005, but it is unclear who 
won the seat. Source: African Elections Database website http://africanelections.tripod.com/zanzibar.html). 
20 However, four more parties contested the 2005 Zanzibari presidential elections, and another three parties have at least 
some presence. 
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1.4 Recent Reforms and Developments 
The Bunge has implemented several reform measures to safeguard its independence and improve its 
performance. These measures include the revision of the standing orders to allow MPs 
(“backbenchers”, i.e. MPs who are not members of the cabinet) to propose legislation through 
private member’s bills, to allow parliament to amend draft legislation, and to oblige the Public 
Accounts Committee to submit its annual report in a timely fashion for debate in plenary.  
Equally important is the establishment in 2007of the National Assembly Fund, which 
earmarks a budget line for the National Assembly in the national state budget.21 This Fund gives the 
National Assembly the autonomy and flexibility of spending money according to its own priorities, 
e.g. for capacity-building activities, the hiring of legal and financial expertise, and for improving the 
documentation and library services. The Fund regulations also allow the National Assembly to 
receive external funding, which has become the main mechanism by which the donors are 
channelling their support for parliamentary reform and strengthening (IPU 2009:33). 
Two five-year corporate work plans for parliament have being developed, one for the Union 
Bunge22 and one for the Zanzibar House of Representatives. These corporate plans set out the 
structure and functions of the National Assembly, assess the current situation, and outline the 
infrastructure development and institutional restructuring needs.23 
Especially since 2005, and despite the increasing dominance of the CCM, the Parliament of 
Tanzania has also asserted its oversight and ‘checks and balances’ function. This has happened in 
particular through an increasing number of hearings and questions (in particular the ‘Prime 
Ministers Questions’; parliamentary questioning time of the Prime Minister), and through the 
reform of the standing orders that also allow the speaker to appoint ad hoc committees of scrutiny 
and investigation.  
Besides, the standing committees have increased their professionalism, in particular the 
oversight/scrutiny committees such as the Public Accounts Committee (budgets), the Local 
Government Committee, and the Finance Committee. Significantly, through for instance the 
Richmond Energy scandal, which the Bunge handled well and that led to the resignation of the 
Prime Minister and two more ministers, the Bunge has understood its potential powers and 
increased its institutional self-esteem.24 
1.4.1 Economic Development and a Missing ‘Bourgeoisie’? 
Tanzania still suffers politically from a lack of a diversified economy. In political economy terms, 
this shortcoming has stunted the development of a private sector based ‘national bourgeoisie’ and a 
middle class, and thus the development of independent civic institutions, which are normally 
associated with ‘liberal’ politics and checks on state powers.25  
                                                     
21 Before 2007, the National Assembly received funding through allocation from the Treasury and Ministry of Finance, 
and MPs were treated and remunerated as civil servants. 
22 United Republic of Tanzania 2007. 
23 Three goals are identified: to improve the secretariat, to enhance law-making, and to improve the oversight role of 
parliament (Republic of Tanzania 2007: 41).  
24 The Bunge set up a Select Committee under the chairmanship of CCM MP Harrison Mwakyembe to investigate the 
controversial contract between the government and the Texas-based Richmond Development Company to generate power. 
Three days after the report was tabled in parliament in February 2008, the Prime Minister Edward Lowassa tendered his 
resignation. Thereafter, Minister for Energy and Minerals Nazir Karamagi and the Minister for East African Cooperation 
Dr. Ibrahim Msabaha also tendered their resignations, as well as the Director General of the Prevention and Combating of 
Corruption Bureau (PCCB), Dr Edward Hosea. Immediately thereafter, President Kikwete dissolved the cabinet and 
appointed a new Prime Minister. 
25 Barrington Moore summarised this theorem in his famous words “No bourgeoisie, no democracy” in his 
groundbreaking work Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (1966:418). Although much discussed, this theorem 
is still considered valid in contemporary development theory. 
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The narrow revenue base and the strong donor dependency have induced rent-seeking 
behaviour and ‘elite capture’. Tanzania has seen the emergence of a ruling elite in control of the 
state apparatus (a ‘political class’ in the parlance of Tanzanian academics and the radical 
opposition). Besides, the political, administrative, and military elite that dominates this ‘political 
class’ is probably not interested in any radical changes of the status quo.  
However, there are some signs of economic development in Tanzania that could generate 
new economic activity and more economic diversification, and possibly, in the long term, lead to 
the development of a middle class, which is historically the best guarantee for liberal politics.  
For instance, owing to economic reform and continued political stability and continued help from 
donor assistance (which accounts for 40 per cent of the government’s budget) and a boost from an 
increase in gold exports, Tanzania's economy has picked up the pace of growth. The GDP per capita 
of Tanzania grew by more than 40 per cent between 1998 and 2007, and economic growth reached 
a healthy 7.1 per cent in 2008.  
Furthermore, there are some signs of diversification. Since the 1990s, Tanzania has been 
actively undertaking macro-economic reforms, including a shift from a government/state-led 
economy to a market oriented/private sector dominated economy. In particular, the tourism and 
mining sectors have been reinvigorated. However, there is still a long way to go until civil society 
organisations and political parties will express their views and efficiently and democratically 
represent these various economic interests in the political system.  
1.4.2 Reformers and Resistance 
The obstacles to democratisation are threefold in Tanzania, as in most of Africa. First is a long 
history of an economic system characterised by resource-extraction and exportation, dominated by 
the colonial and post-colonial state (and foreign interests), which has blocked the development of a 
national private sector economy and a middle class (or a ‘national bourgeoisie’). Thus, independent 
civic institutions, ‘liberal’ politics, and checks on state powers, which are normally associated with 
the middle class, are underdeveloped. 
This situation is, in fact, in danger of being aggravated. With the prospect of oil production 
in Tanzania,26 there is a possibility that the country will become ‘oil cursed’: an increase in 
revenues from natural resource extraction can appreciate the exchange rate and render other sectors 
less competitive (the so-called ‘Dutch disease’). In particular, the negative price effect and decline 
in investments might ‘crowd out’ manufacturing and agriculture. 
Besides, the ruling elite would be tempted to capture the new rents generated from 
petroleum exports (and other easily accessible resources) for personal enrichment and power 
purposes. The rents might be spent on consumption, capital flight, waste, and non-productive 
investments. Rich resources will increase the stakes, and could lead to institutional decay as 
politicians are obstructing, manipulating, rising above, and/or dismantling the rule of law and state 
institutions for control and redistribution. In particular, when the state institutions are weak at the 
outset (when the oil boom sets in), as in Tanzania, they might not be able to withstand kleptocratic 
pressures.  
States with weak institutional capacity have elsewhere been unable to hinder group conflict over 
access to resource rents, and failed to hinder (economically unproductive) investment in lobbying 
for protection, subsidies and preferential policies. The political consequences of oil wealth have 
been negative for many petro-states, and most important is the adverse impact on institutions and 
the quality of governance. Statistically, economies relying heavily on the export of natural resources 
                                                     
26 A recently concluded independent geological assessment in Tanzania’s Southern offshore deep oil exploration project 
has shown prospective resource potentials. The Dominion Petroleum Limited’s block 7 shows a deposit of one billion 
barrels of oil, or seven trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and drilling will likely begin within the next two years (Dow Jones 
Newswires, 27 June 2010, http://www.nasdaq.com/aspx/company-news-story.aspx?storyid= 
201006271718dowjonesdjonline000215&title=studydominion-tanzania-prospect-has-1-billion-bbl/oil-potential-source). 
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score particularly low on a wide array of governance indicators. It has been argued convincingly 
that oil dependency tends to thwart democratic development.27 
Second is the political history of presidential domination. In Tanzania, this was coupled 
with a de jure and/or de facto one-party system and a ‘socialist’ style state apparatus under the 
tutelage of the ruling party. In particular, President Nyerere epitomised the vested interests of a 
ruling class embedded in the state bureaucracy and the coercive apparatus (army, police and 
intelligence agencies). This state-dominating elite has all along been resisting changes to the 
dominant role of the state in the economy (for instance, Tanzania took up huge loans to uphold the 
government sector and postpone the structural adjustments prescribed by the IMF and the World 
Bank). Besides, civil society organisations were constrained for many years under the socialist 
system. The state created umbrella organisations to coordinate and control all forms of associations 
and organisations, and CSOs were strongly discouraged, particularly activist ones. 
Third is a social and cultural system in which clientelism, coercion, poverty and illiteracy 
have made the majority subservient and submissive to the dominating power structures. For 
instance, the CSOs have been taking a more active role in influencing state policies in recent years, 
e.g. in budgeting and monitoring through a number of national planning committees and other 
platforms. However, the opportunities for exerting influence are often limited due to restrictions in 
participation and lack of appropriate information provided by the state to the CSOs. Although the 
CSOs have criticised certain procedures and policies, they have also not assumed a strong 
‘watchdog’ role towards the state, and they seldom voice radical criticism.  
Besides, the relationship between the CSOs and ‘the people’ is sometimes similar to a 
patron-client relationship, which leads to top-down approaches. Moreover, too many CSOs jump 
from one issue to another, according to where funding is available, and, above all, when complying 
with conditions set by the donors. Depending on the local situation, civil society may also pursue 
undemocratic goals. In a heterogeneous society like Tanzania, without a firm grounding in 
democratic values, civil society are liable to promote ethnic sentiment, dispute and patronage, 
which, in turn, is likely to impede democratisation and development.  
 
 
                                                     
27 Imagine what will be the consequences if Zanzibar opts for full independence, taking most of the off-shore oil fields 
with them as they go? There is a historic record of (oil) rich provinces seceding, and a historic record of regimes turning 
autocratic when oil booms set in. 
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2. Donor Assistance to the Parliament of Tanzania 
Tanzania has for many years been characterised as the ‘darling’ of the international donor 
community. It is one of the African countries south of the Sahara that has received the most in 
development aid during the last 40 years, and close to 40 per cent of the budget (2008/09) is still 
funded by outside donors. 
2.1 History of Donor Assistance 
Tanzania was not only the largest recipient of foreign aid in sub-Saharan Africa throughout the 
1970s; it was the testing ground for every newfangled development theory that came along. An 
‘army’ of expatriate advisors oversaw hundreds of development projects. As the economy spiralled 
downward in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the World Bank, the IMF and other donors called for 
stringent economic reform: a dramatic structural adjustment of the economy. They pointed to a 
bloated civil service and a moribund productive sector, preaching that both needed to be exposed 
the open market. Nyerere resisted the cure. The government borrowed money, and from the end of 
the 1970s, Tanzania began to accumulate a crippling debt burden from which it has yet to escape.28 
As economic conditions continued to deteriorate, dissension grew within government ranks. 
In 1985, Nyerere resigned, and in 1986, the Tanzanian government succumbed to the IMF terms. 
The grand Tanzanian experiment with African socialism was over. 
 As elsewhere on the continent, structural adjustment was a shock treatment for Tanzania. 
The civil service was slashed by over a third, government-owned enterprises were sold, and 
protective tariffs flattened. Nyerere’s proudest accomplishment, progress towards universal primary 
education, which reached an enrolment rate of 93 per cent in 1980, fell to 57 per cent in 2000.  
Despite increasing aid efforts, the country is still one of the poorest in the world. Tanzania has been 
ranked 151 out of 182 in the United Nations Human Development Index.29 However, donors 
continue to give aid to Tanzania, because of its relatively sound fiscal policies and political stability. 
At the same time, the high-profile corruption scandals in 2008 have led to somewhat more cautious 
donor support. 
With the advent of multi-party politics and democratic openings in the early 1990s, most 
donors added support for good governance and democratisation to their project portfolios. At the 
start of the reform process, Tanzania was identified as being characterised by poor governance 
across the whole spectrum of state activities. However, after 20 years of economic and political 
reform, including market liberalisation, multiparty elections and extensive transparency and 
accountability reforms, Tanzania is now described as one of the more successful examples of good 
governance reform in Africa (Grey and Khan 2010:6).30 This success has been rewarded by even 
more foreign aid largesse, which is now provided mainly as direct budget support through the 
government’s budgetary system.  
                                                     
28 In 1997, Tanzania spent four times as much on servicing its external debt as on health care, a situation that has 
improved only slightly in the past decade. 
29 Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_Human_Development_Index  
30 The story of Tanzania’s success with good governance reforms is more complicated, however. While certain areas of 
poor governance appear to have been effectively addressed through market reforms and by enhancing the transparency 
and accountability of the state, other areas of governance have been left unattended: land management, industrial policy, 
and natural resource management (Grey and Khan 2010:7). 
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2.2 Democratisation and Parliament 
In order to sustain the democratic momentum and institutional reform process, the development 
partners (donors) in Tanzania have embarked on a number of good governance and democratisation 
projects. During the 1995–2005 period, good governance became a core theme in donor support to 
the country, and the government followed up with the establishment of the National Framework for 
Good Governance within its National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (known by its 
Swahili acronym MKUKUTA). A second generation MKUKUTA with a focus on growth is in 
progress. 
In Tanzania, assistance to good governance has taken several forms. One has been to 
promote democracy (“a participatory, democratic, gender balanced and transparent decision- 
making environment”) through facilitation and implementation of the African Peer Review 
Mechanism (APRM), through the provision of civic education, and through support for the National 
Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action plan (NACSAP I + II). Other elements of good governance 
support have been the strengthening of local government authorities, private sector anti-corruption 
work, and human rights training.  
Most importantly, good governance has been supported by improving the electoral process 
and building the capacity of election management bodies, and by strengthening structures and 
institutions of governance and checks and balances (i.e. the parliament, the judiciary, and the 
political parties). The most prominent donor programme in good governance support is the multi-
donor Deepening Democracy in Tanzania Programme (DDTP). 
2.2.1 Deepening Democracy in Tanzania Programme (DDTP) 
The Deepening Democracy in Tanzania Programme (2007–2010) was developed as a follow-up to 
the country’s third multi-party elections in 2005, designed to support the Government of Tanzania 
in its efforts to consolidate and deepen democratic practice (DDTP programme document).31  
The DDTP programme has a total value of over USD 12 million, of which the United 
Kingdom/DFID contribution is by far the biggest with 22 per cent, followed by Norway with 16 per 
cent, Denmark 15, Ireland 13, Sweden 9, EU 8 and the rest contributed by Canada, the Netherlands 
and the UNDP.32 These so-called Development Partners (DPs) is a group of donors where at least 
the bilaterals take a unified position in terms of policy outlook, strategic emphasis, and working 
relationships.33 
A Programme Coordination Office (PCO) hosted and staffed by the UNDP office in Dar es 
Salaam is managing the programme on a day-to-day basis. The PCO is made up of a Programme 
Co-ordinator, a Programme Analyst, and a Financial Administrator. Additionally, there is a Team 
Leader assisted by a senior governance advisor, providing strategic guidance and backstopping for 
the programme. The PCO reports to a donor Oversight Committee (OC).  
The DDTP purpose is threefold: to strengthen the capacity of democratic institutions for 
greater effectiveness; to enhance the understanding and respect for democratic principles, values 
and culture; and to advocate for legal reform towards a more liberalised political environment. The 
DDTP component on strengthening the capacity of democratic institutions includes the election 
management bodies (the National Electoral Commission and the Zanzibar Electoral Commission), 
                                                     
31 The DDTP operationally closed on the 30 June 2010. All activities with the implementing partners came to a close, and 
the project office’s only preoccupation is final reporting and closure. With positive evaluations, however, it is most 
probable that many of the programme components will continue. In particular, the election support component will be 
important, and a 2010 Election Support Project document has recently been signed with the Chairpersons of National and 
Zanzibar Electoral Committees and the UN Resident Coordinator. 
32 For updated info on the DDP Tanzania, see the UNDP hosted website at: www.tz.undp.org/dg_proj_dg_ddtp.html.  
33 This is not the case in every partner country, but probably due to a long-term presence of most DPs in Tanzania, and the 
fact that the group is composed exclusively of so-called ‘like-minded countries’. 
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civil society, media, political parties, and parliament (the Union Parliament and the Zanzibar House 
of Representatives). 
2.2.2 DDTP Parliamentary Support 
The Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), with the support of the Norwegian Agency for Development 
Cooperation (Norad), conducted one of the first parliamentary strengthening projects in Tanzania. 
This project ran from 1993 until 1995 and had a narrow, technical focus on administrative capacity 
and efficiency (basically library support). Following the transition to multi-party politics, the 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) also provided technical support to the Tanzanian parliament, built 
capacity of parliamentary committees, and established communication lines between MPs and civil 
society (representatives of trade unions, universities, the business community, NGOs, and the press) 
(Tsekpo and Hudson 2009:14-15). Furthermore, the UNDP has provided support for many years, 
initially by meeting Parliament’s basic needs for physical infrastructure, and Sweden has supported 
the Parliament since the mid-1990s with exchange of experience between Swedish parliamentarians 
and their Tanzanian counterparts, as well as support to the parliamentary library. 
The USAID and DFID were the first bilateral agencies to engage in parliamentary 
strengthening projects in Tanzania. DFID’s programme Strengthening the Union National 
Assembly of Tanzania (phase one) started in 2000, with a second phase in concert with the USAID. 
This programme of support was initially scheduled to run from 2003 to 2005, with the State 
University of New York (SUNY/CID) as the implementing agency. It aimed at improving the 
representational, lawmaking and oversight functions of Parliament. Activities conducted included 
constituency level hearings on public bills; joint parliamentary–civil society workshops and issue 
papers; study visits and workshops; outreach programmes; the development of a parliamentary 
newsletter; support for a women’s caucus; and more (Tsekpo and Hudson 2009:14-15).34  
Currently, the development partners are undertaking parliamentary support within the 
framework of the Deepening Democracy in Tanzania Programme (DDTP). The parliamentary 
support component is based upon and supports the parliament’s own strategic plans,35 and the 
component is co-ordinated and administered on a day-to-day basis by the PCO (UNDP office) in 
Dar es Salaam.36 
The parliamentary component has focus on strengthened capacity of the Union Parliament 
and the Zanzibar House of Representatives for policy research and budget oversight. Through the 
DDTP, the Bunge was supported for conducting training for MPs, support for committees on 
specific issues, outreach seminars, support to the media component for improving reporting on 
parliamentary activities, and enhancing awareness regarding challenges faced by women seeking 
political space. It also supported specific training for targeted technical staff such as the reporters, 
ICT staff, research staff, etc., and promoting regional and international interests through 
participation in regional parliamentary forums. Among the most recent activities are training 
seminars for parliamentary committees and staff on elections, budgets, corruption, and office 
                                                     
34 According to Tsekpo and Hudson, the USAID in Tanzania claims that the project came to a conclusion in 2007 because 
of funding difficulties, whereas other interviewees suggested that the programme encountered serious implementation 
difficulties because of an uneasy relationship between the executing agency (SUNY) and key parliamentary personnel, 
including the Speaker (Tsekpo and Hudson 2009:15-16). “In Tanzania, a USAID initiated project, to be implemented by 
the State University of New York, encountered much resistance and raised concerns about parliamentary/political 
sovereignty. This led DFID and others to conclude that it would make more sense to support and work directly with the 
Parliamentary Administration, and with UNDP – seen as a less political actor than USAID – in the lead” (Hudson and 
Wren 2007:40).  
35 The Union Parliament has made a draft Five Year Corporate Plan for the National Assembly of Tanzania (2009–2013) 
(which will be renewed by the new parliament next year), and the Zanzibar House of Representatives have likewise made 
a draft Five Year Corporate Plan for the House of Representatives (2009–2011). 
36 Parliament has indicated through interviews (and in various reports, for instance USAID Tanzania 2010:3) that it has a 
desire to involve the UNDP as a key interlocutor and as the coordinator of future donor assistance. 
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management; outreach and IT support (newsletters and radio/TV programmes); support for statistics 
production and accounting; as well as library support. 
2.2.3 Other Parliamentary Support Efforts 
In addition to the parliamentary support rendered as a part of the DDTP mentioned above, the 
Tanzanian parliament is also benefiting from a number of other assistance and capacity 
enhancement projects run by various international organisations.  
The main bilateral agency involved in parliamentary strengthening projects in Tanzania outside the 
DDTP programme is the USAID. The USAID Tanzania has been providing technical assistance to 
the Parliament of Tanzania since 2003, with a particular focus on the “Institution of Parliament”, i.e. 
the support staff, department of library and research, parliamentary committee operations and the 
departments of information, civic education and protocol/international relations (USAID Tanzania 
2010:2).  
In addition to the USAID, there are other agencies and organisations supporting the 
Tanzanian parliament. Three networks of parliamentarians are engaged in peer assistance. One is 
Parliamentarians for Global Action (PGA), a network of elected MPs from about 130 countries, 
running mainly training courses for MPs on democracy, conflict prevention, international law, and 
human rights). The second is the Association of European Parliamentarians for Africa (AWEPA), a 
network of some 1,500 current and former parliamentarians (from the European Parliament, almost 
all European Union member states, Norway and Switzerland), principally conducting training 
sessions and seminars to enhance the skills of parliamentarians on legislation, representation, and 
oversight. 
The third is the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), an international organisation of 
representatives of parliaments of more than 148 sovereign states. The IPU fosters exchange of 
experience among parliaments and parliamentarians in order to improve their knowledge of 
representative institutions and strengthening their means of action. Alongside the UNDP, the IPU 
was one of the first international organisations to provide technical support to parliaments in the 
Third World, beginning modestly in the 1970s.37 
 There has also been a number of other activities, mainly one-off training sessions for 
knowledge transfer (seminars, conferences, study visits, etc.).38 DFID has also supported the launch 
of the book entitled ‘Parliament with Teeth’ (Dar es Salaam, 2009, Africa Research Institute), 
written by the Tanzanian Speaker of Parliament and two other prominent MPs from opposition 
parties. 
The World Bank is involved in parliamentary strengthening in Tanzania in one specific 
area, public finance management. In addition, the World Bank has developed the Parliamentary 
Network on the World Bank (PNoWB), which has brought together Tanzanian parliamentarians for 
training and networking.  
                                                     
37 See www.pgaction.org, www.awepa.org and www.ipu.org. We have no information on these organisations’ level of 
activity in Tanzania or the amounts of money involved, but we know Sida (along with other donors) has been supporting 
the two organisations at the global level. Other parliamentary organisations that may possibly have been active in 
Tanzania include the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA), the Parliamentary Centre (PC), the African 
Parliamentary Union (APU), the SADC Parliamentary Forum, the Global Organization of Parliamentarians against 
Corruption (GOPAC), and African Parliamentarians’ Network Against Corruption (APNAC). 
38 For instance, the Norwegian Oil for Development programme and Petrad, in cooperation with the Norwegian Embassy 
in Tanzania, held a two-day seminar for parliamentarians on good governance in the petroleum sector in Dar es Salaam 
and in Zanzibar, in November 2009.   
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3. Donor Assistance to Other Parliaments 
The legislature is potentially the most powerful of all government branches in a democracy, and a 
strong parliament is indicative of a healthy democratic governance system. It is normally tasked to 
perform three core functions: representing the electorate, legislation or lawmaking (including the 
passage of the national budget as law), and oversight of the executive branch of government (Mezey 
1985).  
For a parliament to fulfil the above functions effectively, it must be elected freely and fairly 
through periodic elections and be representative of the full range of constituencies in society. 
Besides, for lawmaking to be effective, the legislators need to have the requisite skills, knowledge, 
and insights for scrutinising bills emanating from the executive and to some extent have its own 
capability to draft bills. Furthermore, a well functioning parliament must have the constitutional 
powers and means to restrain and hold the executive to account.  
3.1 General Trends39 
Today, donor agencies are supporting parliaments as an element of their good governance 
strategies. However, this particular sub-field of assistance is a latecomer to the donor community. It 
only gained momentum in the early 1990s, in particular due to the democratic openings of Eastern 
Europe and the ‘third wave’ of democratisation in Africa. Today, strengthening parliaments has 
become a regular feature of the programmes of many donor organisations, such as the UNDP, the 
European Commission, the USAID, DFID, and others (IPU 2003:4). 
 Donor assistance to parliaments is seen as an important element in achieving development 
aid effectiveness in general. It is assumed that recipient countries can and should develop their own 
oversight capacity and accountability mechanisms, including those exercised by parliaments. The 
changing aid architecture with the devolution of project execution to recipients attests to that 
(perhaps best exemplified by the increasing use of budget support in line with the principles of the 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness).40 
 However, the donor community has been cautious in moving into politically charged fields 
such as parliamentary support. Together with political party support, the sub-field has long been 
considered too political to enter; hence the reluctance to become involved. Conventionally, aid has 
been conceived as apolitical and largely a technical matter. 
 
The implicit assumption is still that the obstacles to better governance and 
development performance are primarily financial, technical and managerial, and that 
progress can be made through more appropriate policies, capacity building, 
strengthening demand from civil society and dialogue or conditionality to change the 
behaviour of key individuals (Unsworth 2009: 886). 
 
This apolitical conception lingers on as evidenced by the modest support for parliaments and 
political parties. However, after decades of meagre results, the acceptance that one of the main 
stumbling blocks to effective aid delivery is of a political nature has led to political considerations 
in aid programmes and negotiations. Some donors gradually started to apply political economy 
analysis to the countries with which they cooperate. Even so, throughout most of the 1990s, 
governance was interpreted rather restrictively to mean economic governance or sound management 
of the economies of recipient countries, and there is still some way to go before donors fully accept 
that “politics is not an optional extra or something that gets in the way of development. It is central 
                                                     
39 This chapter draws extensively on Tostensen and Amundsen 2010. 
40 Full text available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf. 
CMI REPORT DONOR SUPPORT TO PARLIAMENTS – TANZANIA AND BEYOND R 2010:8 
 14
to the whole endeavour” (Unsworth 2009:891). To include parliamentary support as an integral 
element in donors’ ‘good governance’ efforts is one step in the right direction. 
3.1.1 Forms of Support 
Although a necessary political institution, a functioning parliament is not a sufficient precondition 
for a democratic system to work. Donors have had to consider parliamentary strengthening projects 
in a broader context. Such contextualisation includes political economy and regime characteristics, 
the role of the electoral system, the political parties, and political culture. Parliaments are linked to 
constituencies, civil society, organised interests, the media, political parties, ministries, international 
bodies, etc., all of which have a considerable bearing on their functioning. This contextualisation 
has made parliamentary strengthening projects challenging and complex to design, implement, and 
evaluate. 
 There are several possible and actual forms of support for parliaments. Different donors 
seem to prefer divergent strategies and support models. One basic categorisation of existing (and 
theoretically possible) forms of donor support to parliaments is the distinction between direct and 
indirect support. 
 Direct support is support to parliaments for the purpose of democratisation, checks and 
balances, and good governance. Normally, the recipient parliament is the direct beneficiary and 
counterpart (or some parliamentary sub-unit, including commissions, secretariat, and groups of 
parliamentarians). Sometimes, the contract partner and project implementer can be international 
parliamentary networks and organisations, international NGOs and intergovernmental organisations 
(IGOs, such as the WBI, the UNDP, UNIFEM and other UN agencies), and even private, for-profit 
consultancy companies. 
 Indirect support is support for the purpose of promoting policy goals such as poverty 
reduction, HIV and AIDS prevention, environmental protection, decentralisation, and anti-
corruption. Indirect support normally includes organisations other than parliaments as recipients, 
contractual partners and implementers, e.g. government agencies and NGOs. Indirect support has 
also been called ‘issue-based’ approaches to parliamentary strengthening (Hubli and Schmidt 
2005:6–7).  
Indirect approaches are not addressing good governance and democratisation issues specifically. 
They seek to raise the awareness of parliamentarians on specific policy issues in order to get the 
parliament to approve the necessary legislation and budgets to address the issues. However, to the 
extent indirect approaches are motivated by good governance and democracy purposes, they can be 
useful entry points and a step-by-step approach to democratic practice, especially in hostile 
environments (if strong interests are opposed to a political reform agenda). 
 In the history of parliamentary support, projects focused initially on infrastructure and 
physical facilities, and to some extent on institutional structures. The infrastructure needs were 
glaring in poor developing countries and donors were keen to fill the gaps: the construction of new 
and the rehabilitation and refurbishment of existing buildings, including office and conference 
facilities; the installation and provision of information technology; and the provision of 
photocopying and printing equipment, library and documentation centres.41 
 Only gradually, with the emphasis on good governance and democratisation in the 1990s, 
did support for parliamentary reform and institutional development move up on the agenda, linked 
to constitutional and electoral reform. It became important to demarcate the relationship between 
the executive and the legislature (and other forms of horizontal accountability); to define 
unequivocally the authority of parliament to pass legislation and approve budgets; to specify 
organisational aspects such as the committee structure, the office of the speaker, party groups, and 
the opposition. Similarly, the representational function was highlighted. Institution building came to 
                                                     
41 The very first Norwegian contribution to the Parliament of Ethiopia was a coffee machine! 
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mean predictability and efficiency in the processing of bills and budgets, transparency and 
accountability, and checks and balances.  
 The purpose of parliamentary support is relatively straightforward: to enhance the capacity, 
legitimacy and efficiency of the core functions of parliaments, to enable them to fulfil their 
constitutional and political role better.  
For one thing, the general administrative capacity is important. Administrative services include 
secretarial support, libraries and document handling, research and investigation capacity, 
professional assistance in drafting laws and scrutinising budgets, information technology, and a lot 
more. Without proper administrative support services, MPs will be severely constrained in the 
discharge of their duties. Administrative capacity projects have traditionally received the greatest 
percentage of donor funds. 
 Besides, four parliamentary capacities are regarded as basic. One is legislative capacity. 
Buttressing this capacity involves legal competence building, including the drafting of bills, transfer 
of know-how, training in the application of parliamentary procedures, and the strengthening of key 
parliamentary committees on selected policy, legislation, and budget issues.  
This may involve parliamentary administration and support staff as well. In fact, most parliamentary 
support projects are focused on the skills of parliamentarians and the professionalism of support 
staff. Unfortunately, a fair proportion of elected MPs in the developing world have limited formal 
education, some may even be only semi-literate, and the turnover rate (percentage of new MPs after 
election) is often more than half the members.  
 Projects in this category engage in knowledge and skill transfer through training, seminars, 
conferences, partnership programmes, parliamentary exchange programmes, networking and study 
visits. The potential issues are unlimited: the rights and responsibilities of MPs, constitutional and 
legal knowledge, proficiency in process and procedure, budgeting, committee work, international 
co-operation, networking, time management, computer skills, voter outreach, anti-corruption and an 
array of other policy issues, etc.  
The training of parliamentarians is, however, a Sisyphean task. Not only will the 
implementation of training programmes constantly generate new needs for knowledge and greater 
proficiency, but once one batch of MPs has been trained a large proportion of them will lose the 
next election and be replaced by novices. The turnover rate of parliamentarians often reaches 30–50 
per cent, sometimes even more, and initial training (first year) is essential. 
 Second is representational capacity. MPs communication skills often need to be improved 
in order to articulate the views and demands not only of their constituents but also of other interest 
groups in civil society (women, youth, minorities) and to channel them into the national political 
arena.  
Sometimes, particular groups of parliamentarians may have specific needs in order to assert 
the interests of the group and its constituencies. Many parliaments now have women’s caucuses. 
While the female and male MPs alike may need training in gender issues, the former usually take 
the initiative to organise gender sensitisation sessions. Other special parliamentary groups that may 
deserve attention are persons with disabilities, youth, and ethnic and religious minorities. 
 Third is oversight capacity. To strengthen its capacity of oversight and control parliament 
may need re-organisation. For instance, permanent committees may need to be established to 
parallel the structure of government ministries; MPs may need training in various political processes 
like questions, hearings, investigations and budget tracking, and on technically complicated policy 
issues. Furthermore, a new parliamentary calendar and sitting frequency can be beneficial, a 
revision of parliamentary procedures useful, and the introduction of new internal regulations, e.g. 
codes of conduct. Equally critical is communication and networking skills, with CSO and media 
and other allies in the scrutiny of executive action. The CSOs and the media can be valuable sources 
of information and dissemination that MPs can use in exercising their oversight function. 
 When parliament is particularly weak (in relation to the executive), the oversight and 
control function will have to be strengthened by supporting the oversight committees and the 
opposition. The oversight and audit committees typically include public accounts (budgets), local 
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government, finance, and public works. There may also be important ad hoc committees of scrutiny 
and investigation, and sometimes there are human rights, parliamentary reform, and public 
complaints committees worth supporting. The opposition can benefit from (financial and/or 
technical) support to the office of the ‘leader of the opposition’ and the ‘shadow government’. 
3.1.2 Coordination and Baskets 
Another way of typologising parliamentary support is to look at the form of financing. There is a 
distinction between programmes/projects financed by one individual donor agency only and those 
that are basket funded (by several bilateral and/or multilateral agencies). 
Without a priori suggesting one is better than the other, statistics demonstrate that the 
proportion of parliamentary support channelled through basket funds (projects with financial 
contributions by more than one donor) versus single-donor projects is on the increase to about 30 
per cent overall. This is an indication of better donor harmonisation and cooperation. However, this 
increase took place primarily before 2003, from then onwards there seems to be no further increase 
in basket funding (Tostensen and Amundsen 2010:97). 
However, the medium-sized donors (Norad, Sida and DFID)42 are cooperating in basket-
funded projects to a much higher degree than CIDA and the USAID, which tend to operate largely 
on their own. The USAID even recorded a significant decrease in basket funding to about 5 per cent 
(average for 2003–2009).43 Sida is cooperating most; on average 80 per cent of its contributions 
since 2003 have been channelled through basket arrangements, with Norad and DFID following suit 
with 68 and 61 per cent, respectively. The level of Norad cooperation through baskets is falling 
(ibid.). 
3.1.3 Implementing Agencies 
Another distinction is between programmes/projects with the recipient parliament itself as contract 
partner (to the donors) and implementing agency, and programmes/projects with some intermediary 
implementing organisation. The implementing organisations may be other government agencies 
(e.g. a ministry or specialised institution), some international parliamentary network or organisation 
(such as AWEPA, IPU, CPA, PC and PGA),44 international NGOs or intergovernmental 
organisations (such as the WBI, UNDP, UNIFEM and other UN agencies), party-affiliated 
foundations and institutes (e.g. the WFD, NIMD, FES, KAS, NDI, IRI, OPIC, etc.),45 university 
institutes and even private, for-profit consultancy companies (such as SUNY/CID, ARD Inc., and 
DAI). 
 Statistics show that the choice of implementing organisations differs among the donors, that 
some have particular priorities (Tostensen and Amundsen 2010:101). The USAID differs 
significantly from the other donors by a large share (some 42 per cent) of projects being 
implemented by private, commercial companies (consultancy companies cum academic 
institutions). In particular, the huge USAID Iraq Legislative Strengthening Program (USD 24 
million) contributes to that overall figure. The USAID also differs significantly from the other 
                                                     
42 Medium-sized in terms of funds allocated to parliamentary strengthening, not development aid in general. 
43 US Congressional Rules explicitly prohibit the provision of basket funds, although new efforts are underway to enable 
participation in basket funding (i.e. pooled funds managed by non-governmental organisations). 
44 Association of European Parliamentarians for Africa (AWEPA), Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Association (CPA), Parliamentary Centre (PC) and Parliamentarians for Global Action (PGA). For a 
complete list of Parliamentary Organizations’ Secretariats Worldwide, see the World Bank interactive map at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/PARTNERS/EXTPARLIAMENTARIANS/0,,content
MDK:20242065~menuPK:498327~pagePK:64165880~piPK:64165858~theSitePK:464534,00.html 
45 Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD); the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy, NIMD; Friedrich 
Ebert Stiftung (FES) and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), National Democratic Institute (NDI), International 
Republican Institute (IRI), and the Olof Palme International Center (OPIC). 
CMI REPORT DONOR SUPPORT TO PARLIAMENTS – TANZANIA AND BEYOND R 2010:8 
 17
donors by not using IGOs (inter-governmental organisations such as the WBI, the UNDP, and other 
UN agencies) as executing agencies (ibid.). 
 The medium-sized donors all enter into both direct contracts with parliaments in recipient 
countries as implementing institutions, and they assign contracts to international and national NGOs 
and inter-governmental organisations (such as the UNDP), to varying degrees. Norway seems to 
prefer IGOs, whereas CIDA and Sida seem to prefer INGOs/NGOs and particularly international 
parliamentary organisations. Sida and CIDA are using direct projects/programmes to a lesser degree 
than the other donors are (ibid.).  
3.1.4 Measuring Impact 
Parliamentary assistance is a field of aid whose effects, outcomes and impact are exceedingly 
difficult to gauge. As in other governance areas, the methodological challenges in measuring effects 
are formidable for a host of reasons. Parliaments are ‘moving targets’ with multiple functions, and 
the political problems they are supposed to address vary greatly. That is why the ODI/PC report on 
Parliamentary Strengthening and the Paris Principles stated that 
 
… there is little systematic research or analysis about the effectiveness of parliaments 
or about the effectiveness of parliamentary strengthening. This makes it difficult for 
those considering whether and how to spend resources on parliamentary strengthening 
to make well-informed decisions (Tsekpo and Hudson 2009: 1). 
 
However, one well-known statistical instrument is the World Bank Institute’s Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI), which is based on composite time-series data on a range of 
governance indicators.46 They capture six key dimensions of governance: voice and accountability; 
political stability and lack of violence; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; 
and control of corruption. The data have been compiled since 1996 in over 200 countries 
worldwide. The relevance of these indicators to parliamentary functions and developments is 
limited, however, as the “effectiveness of parliament as lawmaking and oversight institution” is 
addressed by only one (incomplete) dataset of the five indicators. 
 A second global indicator on parliaments measures (changes in) the proportion of seats held 
by women in national parliaments. This is actually one of the Millennium Development Goal 
indicators (and the only governance-related MDG quantitative indicator).47 However, while the 
proportion of women parliamentarians may perhaps be used as an indicator of representation, it 
does not say much more. An increase in the proportion of women does not necessarily strengthen 
parliament as an institution or the democratic process. In Angola, for instance, the substantial 
increase of women parliamentarians (up from 15 to 37.3 per cent from 1992 to 2008) merely 
increased the number of ruling party backbenchers and presidential clients. 
 A third indicator is the number of laws that the legislature is able to debate and pass in a 
session or a term. However, while such an indicator, on the face of it, may suggest efficiency in the 
law-making function of parliament, it might just as well reflect subservience to the executive by 
rubber-stamping legislation without real deliberation. 
 Yet another (limited) indicator is the openness of the budget process. Specific attention has 
been given to the budget process and financial accountability, because donors have given priority to 
economic governance. The International Budget Partnership (IBP) compiles on an annual basis an 
Open Budget Index, which evaluates whether central governments give the public access to budget 
                                                     
46 See http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp.  
47 See UN statistics on women seats in national parliaments at http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/SeriesDetail.aspx?srid=557 
and IPU Women in National Parliaments statistics at: www.ipu.org/wmn-e/world.htm. 
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information and opportunities to participate in the budget process. It also examines the ability of 
legislatures and auditors to hold their governments to account.48  
 In terms of the representational function, a potential indicator might be the number of 
questions asked in parliament. This is similar to the score-cards that are becoming popular, for 
instance in Uganda.49 However, a weakness of such an indicator is that it will only record what 
takes place in plenary sessions rather than the actual impact of such questions. This indicator does 
also not take into account the work that MPs perform in committees. 
 In other words, there is no general agreement on the role of parliaments in liberal 
democracies, and little systematic data on parliamentary performance that is comparable in time and 
space. Furthermore, there is still relatively little systematic, let alone comprehensive, knowledge of 
the basic facts and figures on donor support to parliaments, and even less on the structural 
conditions under which such assistance can be effective and efficient.50  
3.2 Comparative Lessons 
Nevertheless, from the literature on parliamentary support – academic and agency literature – there 
are some important key lessons emerging.  
3.2.1 Contextualisation 
Several reviews, positioning papers, and evaluations by different donors have stressed and reiterated 
the need for better contextualisation of interventions designed to strengthen parliaments (Schmidt 
2007:2 and 5; Sida 2006:6). Already in 2000, a leading donor (USAID 2000:8) made it clear that: 
 
… legislative strengthening is not a one-size-fits-all or a ‘cookie cutter’ exercise. 
Indeed, donors must take the time to understand the political culture of the nation with 
which they are working; they should be sure that the program they recommend meets 
the needs of the legislature, perhaps by allowing the host legislature to play an 
important role in assessing its own needs. Legislative strengthening projects have not 
always sufficiently analyzed and taken into account the way traditional political 
cultures interact with a country’s institutions and laws. 
 
This lesson is robust indeed: there is no generic, one-size-fits-all approach to parliamentary 
strengthening. The variety of parliamentary structures, political systems, party systems, and 
electoral systems is so great that one must customise approaches to the prevailing conditions. 
Furthermore, a blueprint approach is not advisable because politics and parliaments are dynamic. 
They are moving targets that require flexibility over time. For donors, contextualisation requires 
politically savvy analysts who can monitor developments in an impartial manner, produce political 
economy analyses and adjust interventions accordingly.  
 The imperative of contextualisation means inter alia that parliamentary assistance must be 
mainstreamed to democracy assistance in general. International assistance projects designed to 
strengthen parliaments should in particular consider regime type, political parties and electoral 
system as key elements. 
When designing parliamentary support interventions, the most fundamental distinction donors need 
to make is between presidential and parliamentary systems and the hybrid variants in between. In 
                                                     
48 See http://www.openbudgetindex.org/  
49 On the Uganda MP scorecards, with examples, see: 
http://ddp.ug/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=85&Itemid=89. 
50 This is lamented, for instance, in a report from a donor coordination meeting on parliamentary support in October 2008 
(DFID, UNDP and WBI 2008; DFID, WBI and CPA 2008). However, the knowledge portal Agora (www.agora-parl.org) 
has significantly increased the possibility of institutional memory and learning! 
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presidential systems, the president is elected directly and usually holds the dual position of head of 
state and government, thus commanding considerable executive power, often at the expense of the 
legislature. A president can only be removed from office through an impeachment process. In 
parliamentary systems, however, there is normally a separation of the office of prime minister as 
head of government and that of head of state. While the head of state is largely ceremonial, the 
prime minister holds executive power but is dependent on the confidence of the legislature. 
Stable authoritarian countries present particular challenges for parliamentary support 
because they tend to lack support for democratic reform from the president and the ruling elite, and, 
in effect, little pressure from below due to the repressive nature of these regimes. The elites of such 
regimes prefer maintaining the status quo, from which they benefit. To that end, they are using the 
existing institutional set-up to safeguard their privileged position. In these countries, it would be 
well nigh impossible for donors to find suitable entry points with respect to parliamentary 
strengthening. 
 By contrast to stable authoritarian countries, countries in a process of democratic transition, 
are particularly ‘open’ to parliamentary support projects. We have seen this from the experience of 
the democratisation processes of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, in different waves of 
democratisation in Africa, and in the transition of particular countries such as South Africa and 
Nicaragua. Parliamentary strengthening is particularly opportune in such situations. 
 Likewise, there are differences between Westminster-style (‘First Past the Post’) systems 
and proportional systems that make the opposition different. In Westminster-style parliaments there 
is a tendency that the parties will gravitate into two major parties or party blocks, sometimes with 
the two main parties (party alliances) serially alternating between the two roles. In proportional 
representative systems, there is a greater likelihood of multiple political parties and a divided 
opposition, and thus the opposition parties may have little in common and minimal desire to form a 
united bloc opposed to the government of the day. 
There are often two distinct blocks in Westminster-style parliaments. One is the majority, 
the party with the most seats, and parliamentarians from this party will typically form the 
government (or cabinet). The other block is the opposition, often dubbed ‘loyal opposition’. The 
loyal opposition is the non-governing parties in the legislature that recognise the legitimacy of the 
political system and the ‘rules of the game’ (by their presence and participation in parliament), at 
the same time as they can oppose the actions of the sitting cabinet. This opposition will usually have 
a formally recognised ‘leader of the opposition’ and will often form a ‘shadow government’. 
 The opposition plays a fundamental role in parliaments. First of all, it is the ‘watchdog of 
the watchdog’, securing oversight and accountability. The opposition forms a recognised, even 
semi-official ‘government-in-waiting’. Sometimes, this ‘shadow government’ is not only prepared 
to assume the respective ministries of responsibility should their party come to power, but also top 
opposition leaders will ‘shadow’ the responsibilities, policies and actions of the corresponding 
cabinet ministers.  
In both cases, it is the opposition’s role to present, discuss and promote an alternative 
political programme, i.e. realistic, coherent and different policy options.51 In short, it is the role of 
the opposition to present and represent an alternative programme and leadership, to scrutinise the 
work of the executive, to question the government of the day, and thus hold it accountable to the 
public. 
 Because of its important role, and because it is sometimes restricted in exercising its 
functions (because of political or practical hindrances), donor agencies have in some cases been 
trying to reach out to the opposition. Especially in Westminster-style systems, where the opposition 
has a formally established opposition with a leader and a shadow government, it has been possible 
                                                     
51 The government also has responsibilities to the opposition. First, sufficient resources should be provided for carrying 
out the work of a ‘loyal opposition’. Second, access to information must be guaranteed. Third, there must be some funding 
for publicity and use of the media. Finally, there must be recognition of the special place of the Leader of the Opposition 
and opposition spokespersons. 
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to render political, technical and financial support to the office of the leader of the opposition and to 
the shadow government. In other cases, standing or ad hoc committees have been singled out for 
donor support because they have important oversight roles, but also because they are led or 
dominated by the opposition. 
 Two more ‘contexts’ stand out as paramount: political parties and elections. No parliament 
is likely to function well without political parties, which are the main vehicles for articulating 
demands and grievances from the voters to the top of the political system. However, a recurrent 
problem for donors and development agencies to engage with political parties is that they are “being 
considered too political and therefore too sensitive” (AAPPG 2008:51). There is a tendency, albeit 
weak, of linking parliamentary support projects to political parties, but most donors still keeps an 
arm’s length to political party support because of the political sensitivity (and because foreign 
funding of political parties is simply prohibited by law in many countries). Support is left to 
political party foundations, with relatively little donor engagement, supervision or impact. 
 The electoral system and the electoral process have a strong impact on parliament and the 
wider political system. For instance, the first-past-the-post electoral system in single member 
constituencies as distinct from that of proportional representation – and any combination thereof – 
will have profound implications for the functionality of parliaments. Similarly, polls taken across 
the world show that the manner in which elections are conducted also contributes to shaping the 
way in which parliaments operate. The administration of elections also affects the legitimacy of 
parliaments. 
 The free and fair management of elections, including the independence of electoral 
commissions, election observation and the design of electoral systems must therefore be taken into 
consideration as contextual variables in adopting customised approaches to parliamentary 
strengthening. 
3.2.2 Long Time Horizon 
Effectiveness, let alone long-term impact, in terms of functioning parliaments can only be achieved 
through patient and painstaking work over the long run. A decade would by no means be excessive. 
It should be recalled that electoral cycles are typically 4–5 years. Hence, the duration of an 
intervention over two electoral cycles would be justified, preferably even three or more. It should be 
recalled that politics is dynamic and political institutions such as parliaments are moving targets, an 
aspect of which being the high turnover of parliamentarians at every election. A long-term 
intervention would allow for the flexibility that a moving target demands. 
 Continuity of personnel on both sides of the relationship is crucial in the implementation of 
parliamentary assistance programmes, because they involve building relationships based on trust, 
which can only be achieved in the long term. While MPs come and go, parliamentary staff is 
normally employed on a permanent basis and could thus provide continuity. It is a major problem, 
however, that the turnover of donor personnel is high, which undermines both continuity and 
institutional memory. It would be an advantage for donors to have a field presence of senior staff 
that is politically astute. 
 Development partners’ human resource policies and processes are essential in this respect. 
The pool of donor expertise and experience in parliamentary strengthening is relatively small; only 
the USAID has a full-time agency expert on parliamentary assistance. As parliamentary 
strengthening moves up the international development agenda, the quality of parliamentary 
strengthening work must be boosted. Development partners must ensure that they have sufficient 
numbers of staff with the right skills, professional background and inter-personal qualities to 
operate effectively in a parliamentary environment (AAPPG 2008:45). 
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3.2.3 Demand-Driven 
The Paris Declaration stresses local ownership and alignment, which sums up the donor experiences 
over many years that conditionality and imposition from abroad do not work and are not 
sustainable. Interventions must be anchored in domestic needs and demands. Interventions to 
strengthen parliaments should be demand-driven. Parliamentary strengthening efforts stand a 
chance of succeeding only if they are based on thorough needs assessments produced in conjunction 
with the parliament concerned.  
However, parliaments are not monolithic entities speaking with one voice, and probably 
operate with a dose of patronage. The planning of interventions should, therefore, bring on board 
parliamentary permanent staff (partisan and non-partisan), MPs, the political parties and other 
relevant stakeholders. The speaker and the clerk are key actors and need at a minimum not to be 
opposed to parliamentary strengthening projects; their active participation would no doubt be an 
advantage. A suitable vehicle for implementation would probably be a steering committee 
comprising a variety of interests represented in parliament. 
Interventions should preferably be based on strategic plans for parliamentary development 
that are owned locally. The origin of such plans is critical and questions of whose ownership are 
relevant. Are governments, parliaments, or other societal actors the owners? To reinforce domestic 
ownership it would be worth bringing in stakeholders outside parliament who are nonetheless 
interested in strengthening parliament’s functions, e.g. CSOs. In this regard, there is dialectic in the 
interaction between various domestic actors, on the one hand, and the donors, on the other. The 
latter may find justification for ‘reasonable intrusion’ – albeit with circumspection – if authoritarian 
forces are reluctant or slow in proceeding. At any rate, the implication for donors is that getting 
started may take considerable time. On the other hand, forging ahead without due consideration to 
local hindrances is likely to backfire. Short-term expediency and impatience will probably lead to 
long-term failure. 
3.2.4 Political Sensitivity 
It must be acknowledged that parliamentary strengthening is inherently political in nature and very 
sensitive. This political sensitivity reinforces the previous lessons about ownership and alignment. 
Bilateral donor agencies from former colonial powers or major players on the global scene could 
easily be suspected of harbouring ulterior motives, e.g. promoting specific models or advancing 
foreign policy positions. Their interventions might be perceived to be politically motivated. Two 
insights emerge from this political sensitivity with a view to diffusing tension and ensuring 
effectiveness. 
 First, multilateral agencies such as the UNDP are often seen as more acceptable and less 
liable to being suspected of pursuing agendas at variance with the wishes of the countries 
concerned. Some respondents have maintained, however, that although the UNDP may have a 
comparative advantage in the sensitive field of parliamentary support, it may not be as efficient in 
its operations as bilateral agencies. An alternative to UNDP coordination might be basket funding 
by multiple bilateral donors, coordinated by one of them. This could possibly dissipate some of the 
sensitivity. Apart from redressing the sensitivity problem basket funding also has the advantage of 
saving transaction costs and pooling professional resources, which accords well with the principle 
of harmonisation. On the other hand, while there is merit in donor harmonisation and coordination it 
should not be taken to the extreme. It may be perceived as ‘ganging up’ against the recipient or 
monopolising the expertise and the models that are advanced. Therefore, a measure of pluralism 
may be admissible and leave the choices to be made to sophisticated MPs. 
 Second, peer advice is generally more acceptable to aid recipients than donor guidance. 
Consequently, the involvement of fellow parliamentarians from other countries through 
parliamentary associations may be helpful. We have thus seen a move by some donors away from 
international parliamentary organisations and partnerships with donor country parliaments, to a 
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stronger emphasis on regional parliamentary organisations. This regional approach to parliamentary 
strengthening is also based on the idea that peer-to-peer knowledge transfers and shared experiences 
are more likely to ‘sink in’ than international (read: Western) experiences and standards. For 
instance, the Sida position paper and thematic review favoured an expansion of the range of support 
to parliamentary networks to include local and regional networks (Sida 2006:7 and 9; Hubli and 
Schmidt 2005:6–8).52 An inter-party steering committee would probably also be useful to diffuse 
tension and build trust to overcome the sensitivity. 
3.2.5 Issues as Entry Points 
Parliaments deal with a range of policies and issues. Therefore, parliamentarians are often in dire 
need of information and knowledge about specific policy areas: issue-based approaches provide 
useful entry points. Donors have experienced that training programmes addressing substantive 
issues – as distinct from procedural change or institutional reform – have been convenient entry 
points and met with approval, even enthusiasm. Such substantive issues or themes could cover 
anything across the board of parliamentary work, e.g. gender relations; budget tracking; HIV and 
AIDS; environmental protection; climate change, etc. Such interventions could help to reduce 
sensitivity, build trust and pave the way for other types of intervention, which might be considered 
more sensitive. They could also serve to bridge party divides and promote inter-party consensus on 
important policy matters. 
 Even though issue-based approached may provide useful entry points, it should not be 
forgotten that thematic events run the risk of being futile efforts if not linked to parliamentary work. 
It is necessary, therefore, to include participants who are conversant with parliamentary procedures 
with a view to exploiting the imparted knowledge for parliamentary purposes such as preparing 
laws or policy papers. Over-zealous thematic experts and CSO representatives could undermine the 
very purpose of such events unless they are committed to the parliamentary process. Peer-to-peer 
exchanges would be helpful if coupled with a modicum of contextual knowledge; not all 
parliamentary experiences are readily transferable to other countries. 
3.2.6 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 
The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of 2005 is based on the donor community’s experiences 
in general.53 It was a milestone by which OECD/DAC countries agreed to coordinate policy and 
provide multi-year financing. In return, the developing countries agreed to improve governance and 
financial management and to involve parliaments and civil society more closely in drawing up and 
implementing development policy. It was also agreed that developing countries and donors would 
be accountable to each other for their policies. Although not specifically referring to lessons learned 
from parliamentary strengthening, donor assistance to parliaments should nevertheless adhere to the 
precepts of the Paris Declaration, especially the principles of harmonisation, alignment and 
ownership.  
The relevance of the Paris principles to parliamentary strengthening is positively reinforced 
by the Accra Agenda for Action.54 Here, the responsibility of parliaments in ensuring country 
ownership of development processes is emphasised, and donors agree to support efforts to increase 
the capacity of all development actors, parliaments included. 
                                                     
52 For instance, the East African Association of Public Accounts Committees (EAAPAC), established in 2004 in Nairobi 
and supported by the World Bank (WB), World Bank Institute (WBI), and the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association 
(CPA), is now well established and respected across the region. 
53 Full text available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf. 
54 A Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF-3) was held in Accra, Ghana from September 2-4, 2008. The 
Accra Agenda for Action, full version, is available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ACCRAEXT/Resources/ 
4700790-1217425866038/AAA-4-SEPTEMBER-FINAL-16h00.pdf. 
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3.3 Kenya 
Kenya is a democratic multi-party republic with a presidential system of government, despite the 
British heritage of a Westminster style parliament. Until the recent referendum on the new 
constitution (August 2010) the President was both head of state and head of government, but 
legislative power was and will continue to be vested in the National Assembly. Cabinet members 
are drawn from among the members of the National Assembly. The judiciary is formally 
independent of the executive and the legislature, but during former president Daniel arap Moi’s 
tenure the executive was meddling in the affairs of the judiciary. 
 Kenya has maintained remarkable stability despite changes in its political system and 
occasional incidents, and has remained comparatively stable in the light of the crises in 
neighbouring countries. After independence from Britain in 1963, the charismatic Jomo Kenyatta 
dominated politics. He was succeeded in 1978 by Daniel arap Moi, who remained in power for 24 
years. The ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU) was the only legal political party until the 
early 1990s when unrest and international pressure led to the restoration of multi-party politics. 
 Also, a cross-party parliamentary reform initiative in 1997 revised several oppressive laws 
inherited from the colonial era that had been used to limit freedom of speech and assembly, and 
contributed to improved public freedoms and to generally credible national elections in December 
1997. These elections were nevertheless won by KANU and its presidential candidate Daniel arap 
Moi. 
 More than a decade was to elapse from the democratic opening in 1990 until the opposition 
was able to end nearly 40 years of KANU rule, with Mwai Kibaki and the National Rainbow 
Coalition (NARC)’s landslide victory in the 2002 general elections which international observers 
judged the 2002 elections to be free and fair. They marked an important turning point in Kenya’s 
democratic evolution in that power was transferred peacefully from Moi and KANU to Kibaki and 
NARC.55 
 Kibaki and the NARC coalition government had promised to focus its efforts on generating 
economic growth, combating corruption, improving education, and rewriting the constitution. Some 
of those promises have been kept. The economic growth rate picked up and peaked at 7 per cent in 
2007. Free primary education was introduced and secondary education heavily subsidised. Besides, 
a broad-based, protracted constitutional reform process was carried through to a new constitutional 
proposal. But that proposal was altered considerably in non-transparent ways (Chitere et al. 2006) 
and put to a referendum in 2005 in which it was defeated (Andreassen and Tostensen 2006). Apart 
from its failure to adopt a new constitutional dispensation, the coalition government did little to 
address the main causes of instability: landlessness and unemployment.  
Furthermore, the fight against corruption was less than half-hearted; grand corruption 
scandals such as Anglo Leasing and Goldenberg blew up, but there was a striking lack of political 
will to push the court cases through, leading to a situation of general impunity for top-level officials 
and politicians under Kibaki’s rule.56 
 The last general elections were held in December 2007 (the next ones are due in 2012). In 
these elections, President Kibaki and his new broad electoral coalition under the name of Party of 
National Unity (PNU) ran for re-election against the main opposition party, the Orange Democratic 
Movement (ODM) and its presidential candidate Raila Odinga.   
These elections were flawed and far below international standards (Republic of Kenya 
2008a). Exit polls showed Odinga ahead of Kibaki by 6–7 per cent, but Kibaki was declared the 
President. The ODM won the majority of seats in Parliament. Allegations were raised against the 
partisanship of the Electoral Commission, and Odinga declared himself the “people’s president”, 
                                                     
55 The first time an election leads to a change of government from one party to another is always an important political 
event in a country’s political development, even when the incoming party may include some of the old guard (like in 
Kenya with the moneyed and landed elite still present in the coalition).  
56 The leader of the Anti-Corruption Commission went into exile, fearing for his life (Wrong 2009), and all the implicated 
ministers, barring one, returned into office. 
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and protests escalated into violence and destruction of property (Tostensen 2009). At least 1,500 
people were killed and nearly 600,000 displaced, in violence with ethnic and regional overtones 
(especially between the Kalenjin, Kikuyu and Luo) in addition to the top-level political rivalries 
(Republic of Kenya 2008b). 
 With the backing and pressure of a group of ‘eminent persons of Africa’, the UN, the 
European Union, the African Union and the United States government, Kibaki and Odinga signed in 
February 2008 an agreement on the formation of a ‘grand coalition’ government with 41 ministers 
and 50 assistant ministers. Kibaki retained the Presidency while Odinga occupied the new Prime 
Minister post which was part of the brokered deal, even though the division of responsibilities 
between these two top post remained blurred and caused persistent intra-coalition tension. The 
ministers were drawn from both the PNU and the ODM camps.   
 A new referendum was held on 4 August 2010, by which a renegotiated comprehensive 
constitutional proposal was adopted, with far-reaching implications for the governance system of 
Kenya. Basically, the new constitution will eliminate the position of Prime Minister and 
simultaneously reduce the powers of the President.57  
3.3.1 Parliament of Kenya 
In June 1982, the Parliament of the Republic of Kenya amended the Constitution of Kenya to make 
Kenya a de jure one-party state, with the Kenya African National Union (KANU) as the only legal 
party. The Kenyan general elections of 1983 and 1988 were conducted under this system.  
 The first multi-party Parliament of Kenya was elected in December 1992, with the 
incumbent ruling party KANU taking 36 per cent of the votes and 100 of the 188 seats (and 
President Moi his re-election). Three opposition parties won significant representation.58 In the 
second multi-party elections in 1997, KANU took 40.6 per cent of the votes and 107 of the 195 
seats, and four opposition parties won significant representation.59 
 In the fourth multi-party elections in 2002 KANU was defeated after 40 years’ incumbency. 
The National Rainbow Coalition60 won an absolute majority with 56.1 per cent of the votes and 122 
of the 224 parliamentary seats. KANU won only 29 per cent of the votes and 68 of the seats.61  
 In the run-up to the elections of 2007, Kenyan politics went through a number of party splits 
including of the Rainbow Coalition, and ended up with 144 registered parties and 23 parties 
winning some parliamentary representation. In particular, primaries were chaotic and marred by 
irregularities and violence, and numerous candidates defected to smaller parties or created new ones 
after failing to secure the candidature of their respective parties (Andreassen et al. 2008). 
 The 2007 elections saw the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM, with its presidential 
candidate Odinga) win most seats with 99, while the Party of National Unity (PNU, now the party 
of incumbent president Kibaki)62 won only 43 parliamentary seats. An ODM splinter party, ODM-
                                                     
57 According to some accounts, Kenyan political system will continue to be presidential, but the constitution will devolve 
some powers to the regions, checks and balances will be secured through a more independent judiciary (with judges 
appointed by the Judicial Services Commission, not the president), and presidential appointments will require 
parliamentary approval (Economist, 31 July– 6 August 2010:28-29). It is still unclear how the institutional arrangements 
will be worked out in detail. 
58 FORD-Asili (Matiba) won 31 seats, FORD-Kenya (Odinga) won 31 seats, and the Democratic Party (Kibaki) won 23 
seats. Three small parties won one seat each. 
59 The Democratic Party (Kibaki) 31 per cent and 39 seats, NDP (Odinga) 10.8 per cent and 21 seats, FORD-Kenya 
(Wamalwa) 8.2 per cent and 17 seats, and Social Democratic Party (Ngilu) 7.9 per cent and 15 seats. Five smaller parties 
won altogether 11 seats. 
60 NARC was a coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party, the Democratic Party, FORD-Kenya, and the National Party of 
Kenya.  
61 FORD-People took another 15 seats, and four smaller parties another seven seats. 
62 Until the beginning of September 2007 it was not clear on which party's ticket the president was going to run. The PNU 
was created only shortly before the December 2007 elections, as a Kibaki’s construct and initially with himself as the only 
personal member besides the corporate membership of a number of affiliated parties including KANU, NARC-Kenya, 
Ford-Kenya, Ford-People, Democratic Party, Shirikisho, National Alliance Party of Kenya and others. 
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Kenya gained 16 seats, and the erstwhile incumbent party KANU gained 14 seats. A large number 
of other, smaller parties gained from one to five MPs each. 
 With various pre- and post-election coalitions formed, defections and by-elections taking 
place, two blocks have crystallised in Kenyan politics, both with some ‘Rainbow Coalition’ 
credentials: the ODM/Odinga and allies, on the one hand, and the PNU/Kibaki and allies, on the 
other. The blocks are capricious, but with the power-sharing agreement and grand coalition 
government of 2008, the parliamentary opposition to the (grand coalition) government is negligible. 
 The National Assembly of Kenya (or Bunge) is a unicameral national assembly with 224 
members, 210 elected for a five-year term in single-seat constituencies, 12 members nominated by 
the political parties in proportion to their share of seats won in the single-member constituencies, 
and two ex-officio members, the attorney general and the speaker.63 
 The current parliament (the Tenth Parliament, 2007–2012) has seen significant 
developments. On the positive side, the Kenya National Assembly has aggressively pursued 
allegations of corruption and financial mismanagement in several well-known financial scandals, 
which has resulted in the dismissal of several cabinet ministers and government officials.64 The 
introduction of Constituency Development Funds (CDFs)65 and other development funds have 
helped to increase the independence of parliament by making individual MPs less dependent on the 
executive branch for community development resources and patronage. Besides, legislative 
committees have become more active and there has been an increase in the number of major bills 
passed (DFID/USAID 2009:3), and the budget unit of parliament has been strengthened.66 
 On the negative side, the hotly contested 2007 presidential elections and the post-election 
violence had repercussions on the political dynamics and the operation of the National Assembly. 
For instance, the National Assembly was for a long time preoccupied by the political crisis and 
paralysed by the conflict between President Kibaki and Prime Minister Odinga. Besides,  
 
The National Accord agreement ending the post-election violence created a Grand 
Coalition of the two major political parties, thereby ensuring that there would be no 
formal opposition within the National Assembly. In addition, with forty-two percent of 
the members of the National Assembly serving in the cabinet, either as ministers or 
deputy ministers, the ability of the national Assembly to continue to oversee, and hold 
the executive accountable, may be greatly diminished (DFID/USAID 2009:3).  
                                                     
63 The president is elected simultaneously for the same five-year term. The constitution of Kenya has three requirements 
for a candidate to be declared winner: he/she must garner the largest number of votes (the plurality) among all contestants 
nationwide in absolute terms; win at least 25 per cent of the vote in at least five of Kenya's eight provinces; and be elected 
Member of Parliament. Thus, the presidency can be won with less than 50 per cent of the vote, in which case no run-off 
election is required. The other two requirements are absolute. 
64 The follow-up of the court system has been weak, however, with very few cases brought to court and even fewer 
sentences passed. Besides, the dismissed ministers have all bounced back, so that impunity is still the rule of the game. 
65 The CDF was introduced in 2003. The idea is to relieve the MPs of the pressures of their constituencies in regard to 
(promised) development projects. The Constituency Development Fund has an elaborate legal framework, premised on a 
policy that individual MPs have no direct access to the CDF funds and that the MPs only participate with their 
constituencies to identify the projects to be funded by an amount set aside for the CDF during a particular Financial Year. 
The current budgetary allocations are about USD 110 million, which means an average of USD 524,000 per constituency. 
Critics of the CDFs have dubbed them the MPs’ re-election funds and much misuse has been exposed. Comparable CDF 
arrangements in Uganda are weaker in its regulations, and grossly mismanaged as yet another source of patronage used by 
the MPs.  
66 Budget units need access to government budget information. The legislation in Kenya has taken a creative approach to 
meeting this need. Rather than granting the National Assembly the authority to compel government to provide budget 
information, the Fiscal Management Bill of 2006 grants the Finance Ministry the authority to obtain budget information 
requested by the National Assembly. Public officers who do not comply face heavy fines and jail terms. 
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3.3.2 Donor assistance to the Parliament of Kenya 
In Kenya, the USAID has been supporting the National Assembly since 2000 through its 
Parliamentary Strengthening Program (PSP). The programme implementer has been and still is the 
Kenya Office of the Center for International Development of the State University of New York 
(SUNY/CID). The first phase ran from 2000 to 2004, and the second phase from 2005 until early 
2010, with DFID/Kenya as a partner.67 
 The USAID/DFID partnership has made the two donors the most active in assistance to the 
National Assembly in Kenya. Regarding the 10th Parliament, the USAID/DFID Parliamentary 
Strengthening Programme supports the implementation of the Kenyan National Assembly’s own 
Strategic Plan 2008–2018 for modernisation. This is focused on the following functions and 
institutions: the parliamentary service commission and committees; the research and analysis 
capacity of parliamentary staff; specialised budget expertise; systems of oversight of government 
expenditure; and parliamentary responses to the post-election crises. 
 The role of SUNY/CID is to provide technical assistance and expert technical analysis to 
the Speaker’s Office, committees, and different service departments; to organise the Parliamentary 
Internship Programme that places between 15 and 25 Kenyan recent university graduates within the 
assembly’s directorates and committees. It is also tasked to facilitate linkages between committees, 
civil society organisations, universities, think tanks and other key stakeholders outside parliament, 
and to organise workshops and conferences. SUNY/CID also assists the ‘watchdog’ committees 
(Public Accounts, Public Investment and Local Authorities Funds Accounts), and the Budget 
Committee and Parliamentary Budget Office to prepare procedures, information and conduct 
hearings. 
 A parliamentary donor sub-group exists under the DGDG and holds regular meetings (at 
least once a month) with SUNY/CID, which, in turn, reports to the DGDG on any key issues. The 
USAID chairs the sub-group. SUNY/CID implements activities as per the agreed policy, but donors 
do not control details. The programme management set-up with SUNY seems to be working well.68 
 In 2009, the USAID/DFID-led programme supported the implementation of new House 
Rules that govern how Parliament conducts its business. The new rules have given access to 
committee hearings for the public and increased Parliament’s watchdog muscle. Nearly 600 MPs 
and legislative staff received training in the new rules. 
  
Like their counterparts in the United States and other Western democracies, Kenyans 
can now watch and listen to their representatives/Members of Parliament (MPs) live on 
television and radio. In June 2009, the Kenya National Assembly (Parliament) took a 
huge step toward opening Parliament to the people by launching the House Live 
Broadcast (HLB) – live TV and radio broadcast of plenary debates. The House Live 
Broadcast is made possible by the partnership between the Kenyan Parliament and 
development partners, led by USAID. The HLB Project is part of the broad-based 
USAID Parliamentary Strengthening Program, which has helped to transform 
Parliament into a modern institution more responsive to the needs of Kenyans (USAID 
Kenya 2009:24).69  
                                                     
67 The funds committed by the USAID (for 2005–2010) are USD 6,598,240 and the contribution of DFID is 
approximately USD 2,000,000. 
68 SUNY/CID as an implementing partner have developed a strong working relationship with the Speaker’s office, and 
Parliament views the organisation as a valuable resource and often turns to them to coordinate various activities. 
SUNY/CID also works with a civil society team known as the Parliamentary Initiative Network (PIN) that has a pool of 
expertise. 
69 The report continues: “Lack of transparency has been a serious impediment to good governance in Kenya. Citizens 
neither saw nor heard what their elected representatives were doing. In April 2009, the passage of new ‘House Rules’ 
provided the legal basis for live broadcasts. It significantly increases the accountability of Parliament to the citizens of 
Kenya, and boosts public understanding of the institution. The broadcasts are also a useful tool for the media, who are 
now able to more accurately report on events in Parliament. Since the inception of HLB, parliamentary debates have 
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Of the other donors to parliamentary strengthening in Kenya, we can mention a regional (multi-
country) programme on budget oversight supported by CIDA that includes Kenya (implemented by 
the Parliamentary Centre’s Accra office), and the dialogue, advocacy and networking support of the 
Parliamentary Network of the World Bank (PNoWB). There was also a Gender and Governance 
Programme supported by Sida and Norad, which was relatively small and had a narrow focus on 
women parliamentarians and has now wound up (Tostensen and Amundsen 2010:117, 123).  
The UNDP has actively been supporting the constitutional reform process and the 
referendum, as well as electoral reform, but is not involved in any direct parliamentary support 
projects in Kenya.70 The European Union (European Commission, EC) is “committed to sustainable 
poverty reduction and to promoting democracy, human rights and good governance in Kenya”, but 
seems also to have no parliamentary support projects in the country. Certain international NGOs are 
active in parliamentary strengthening in Kenya, however, including the CPA and EISA.71 
With the new Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy (KJAS), a larger number of donors has 
partnered up for the period 2009–2013. They include Canada, Denmark, the European Commission 
(EC), Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom, the United States, the African Development Bank, the UNDP, and the World Bank 
Group. The group has formed the Democratic Governance Donor Group (DGDG). 72 
Through the KJAS, support for parliament is integrated into a broader Democratic 
Governance programme, which includes support for elections, public financial management, public 
service reform and other elements. Canada and the World Bank will probably collaborate with the 
USAID and DFID on a new parliamentary support programme, in which Canada is a potential lead 
donor/chair (JKAS 2007:65). The objective of the KJAS is to support the government’s efforts to 
achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the targets that the government has set for 
itself in its national and sector development strategies (the evolving Vision 2030). The KJAS 
outlines the donors’ shared development vision and intention, and will provide for basket-funded 
programmes, although bilateral programmes and agreements will continue in parallel. 
With a new constitution approved, there is a renewed interest by various donors in working 
with parliament. Donors and the Speaker and Clerk of the Kenya Parliament are now in the process 
of discussing the future of parliamentary support in Kenya. A new post-constitutional parliamentary 
support programme will be developed over the coming months and may supersede the modalities of 
the current PSP programme. So far, DFID has made a new commitment of USD 5,350,000 (for 
2010–2015) and the USAID has made a commitment of USD 6.5 million (for 2010–2014), and the 
Canadians and other donors are considering joining this new PSP in Kenya. Again, SUNY/CID will 
be the project implementer, with the USAID and DFID both having a programme officer working 
with them. 
3.3.3 Lessons Learnt from Kenya 
The first lesson learnt from Kenya is that the evolving political environment can profoundly affect 
the proceedings and work of the parliament, as well as donors’ parliamentary support. The 2007–
2008 political crisis, the Grand Coalition of the two main political parties, and the Coalition 
Government profoundly changed the role of the opposition in the National Assembly, and reduced 
                                                                                                                                                                 
become the most popular broadcast in the nation. MPs report a sharp increase in awareness of parliamentary activity, as 
constituents expect to see MPs speak during important floor debates. One result, they say, is to ensure that they attend 
plenaries and prepare better than they would have before” (ibid.). 
70 The UNDP has not been an active supporter of parliament in Kenya in the past, but lately the UNDP has shown an 
interest and attended donor meetings on the issue. 
71 EISA’s Africa Democracy Strengthening Programme has a parliamentary strengthening component in Kenya funded by 
DFID. 
72 The UNDP has expressed interest in working with parliament and have recently joined the parliamentary donor sub-
group. 
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the institution’s active oversight role of checks and balances. The political focus has (at least until 
very recently with the constitutional referendum of August 2010) been on the reconciliation process 
and the rivalry between the two leading political figures, rather than on urgent development issues. 
 The second lesson from Kenya is the importance of good working relations between the 
National Assembly and civil society. Currently, Kenya has a vibrant parliament-focused civil 
society and private sector community that has been providing policy analyses and support for 
legislative work. Parliament is still under-capacitated in research and legal drafting, and some CSOs 
have helped out. There is need, however, for better mechanisms for coordinating the support CSOs 
are ready to provide to the parliament. 
3.4 Uganda 
Uganda is formally a democracy, but the president, the military and the ruling party sturdily 
dominate this polity, with overt tendencies of clientelism, nepotism, and militarism. The country has 
not had a peaceful, constitutional transfer of power since independence in 1962. 
In the period after President Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Army (NRA) 
took power in 1986, Uganda was successively a ‘no-party’ or, in effect, a one-party system 
dominated by the president, his army and the National Resistance Movement (NRM party). Uganda 
formally returned to multiparty politics only in 2005 after a referendum. 
However, in 2005 the parliament voted to abolish limits on presidential terms that would 
have prevented President Museveni from standing for a third term, and Museveni is reportedly 
preparing for his son, Lt Col Muhoozi, to succeed him.73  
The first multi-party elections after formal democratisation were the presidential, 
parliamentary and local elections in 2006 (Kiiza et al. 2008). These were marred by politically 
motivated violence, intimidation, and bribery of voters, virtually none of which were neither 
investigated nor prosecuted, a failure that reinforces a culture of impunity (HRW 2009:1). The 
second general elections – presidential, national assembly and local – are scheduled to take place in 
February/March 2011. 
3.4.1 Parliament of Uganda 
The first multi-party parliament of Uganda was elected for a five-year period in 2006. Parliament 
comprises the National Assembly, which has 327 members, 215 of whom are elected by direct 
universal adult suffrage in single-seat constituencies, plus 79 seats specially reserved for women.74 
In addition, there are 15 representatives elected by interest groups such as workers, youth and 
people with disabilities (five each), ten representing the army (nominated by the Army Council), 
and six  ex officio members and ministers.75 
 The National Resistance Movement (NRM), the incumbent party emanating from 
Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA), dominates the National Assembly with 191 of the 
284 directly elected MPs including women seats, and 228 of the total of 327 members (70 per cent). 
Three other parties are important: the biggest opposition party Forum for Democratic Change 
(FDC) with 37 representatives, the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) with nine, and the Democratic 
Party (DP) with eight representatives.76  
                                                     
73 In August 2010, “President Yoweri Museveni said (…) will seek the nomination of the ruling National Resistance 
Movement Party” for the next elections, which will imply a total tenure of altogether 30 years (Sunday Times, 29 August 
2010).  
74 There is one specially elected women representative per district. The number of districts, however, will rise to 90 in the 
next elections.  
75 Ex officio members are for instance the vice-president and ministers not already elected Members of Parliament. These 
members are not entitled to vote. 
76 There are two additional parties with only one member each, plus 36 ‘independents’, which is a comparatively large 
number (with a propensity to ‘lean’ towards the RNM).  
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This means the NRM commands the parliamentary majority (including the two-thirds 
majority needed to change the constitution); it controls the agenda, and dominates most committees. 
Furthermore, the party caucus is rather strong, the Westminster style parliament system with most 
government ministers being members of parliament and a party whip system is in place, which adds 
to the executive dominance over the legislature. 
 
Parliament’s ability to exercise its functions effectively has been hindered by among 
others, the dominance of the Executive over the house and a system of patronage that 
promotes upward accountability towards the Executive. Party loyalty, the dominance 
of the ruling party, weakly positioned opposition parties and weak accountability 
relations with constituencies, have also stifled Parliament’s autonomy and oversight 
role (PSC 2010:26). 
 
In fact, while the oversight and accountability committees have tried to improve their performance, 
they have met immense resistance and have repeatedly failed to secure the support of both the 
executive and ruling party MPs when pressing for sanctions against those accused of wrong-doing. 
It is apparent that there are other issues at play, including the lack of ‘political will’, various 
pressures and political interests as well as a deeply entrenched system of patronage hindering 
parliament’s ability to exercise its functions effectively. The power base of the current order is 
grand corruption and the overarching interest is thus to maintain the status quo at all costs. 
The Parliament of Uganda is nevertheless relatively well-equipped in terms of formal, 
constitutional powers and institutional capacity, but it seems incapable of fully asserting these 
powers and tasks. Despite the relatively well-developed institutions, parliament is considered less 
effective now than it was under the ‘Movement system’ of no-party politics. Parliament has also 
experienced some setbacks such as the replacement of some committee chairs with government 
loyalists in 2008 and its marginalisation in dealing with the National Social Security Fund scandal.77 
 However, the strengthening of some of the institutions of the parliament, e.g. the 
Parliamentary Commission, the Parliamentary Service and the Parliamentary Budget Office 
(resulting in part from sustained support by the USAID, DFID, the UNDP and others, see below), 
has helped give parliament a clear identity and the infrastructure to play its roles more effectively, 
particularly as regards financial oversight. For instance, the accountability committees are asking 
incisive questions to government ministries and departments, corruption cases have been heard, and 
parliament has engaged more effectively in the budget process. 
3.4.2 Donor Assistance to the Parliament of Uganda 
The international donor community heavily supported the 2006 elections in Uganda, with a USD 
6.3 million election basket fund, managed by the Danish development agency, Danida. Election 
support will probably increase significantly for the upcoming 2011 elections (HRW 2009:26). 
Commencing in 1997, and continuing to date, the USAID, the UNDP and DFID have been 
key players in parliamentary strengthening in Uganda. Support has ranged from the provision of 
equipment, to capacity building for MPs, parliamentary staff and committees, to institutional 
development, to work with civil society organisations on the demand-side of accountability and 
with political parties, to efforts to strengthen parliament as part of the wider system of an emerging 
democracy (Tsekpo and Hudson 2009:16).  
                                                     
77 The NSSF is a compulsory pension fund that covers all employees in the private sector, including non-governmental 
organisations and parastatal bodies that are not covered by the Government's Pension Scheme. The NSSF has been shaken 
by several investment scandals involving poor judgement, oversight and multiple conflict of interest issues. The most 
recent scandal involved the purchase of a piece of investment property from a cabinet minister without following the 
required tender process. In February 2009, President Museveni fired the Minister of Finance, the Managing Director of the 
NSSF and his deputy. 
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The USAID’s Uganda Parliamentary Technical Assistance Project, which ran from 1998 
until 2002 and was implemented by SUNY/CID, was instrumental in the establishment of an 
independent Parliamentary Budget Office. It was opened in 2001, as the result of a Private 
Member’s Bill, and ultimately accepted and adopted by the government. In this first phase of 
institution building at the advent of multiparty politics in Uganda, the USAID with DFID and other 
DPs helped in the production of a Parliamentary Strategic Investment and Development Plan 
(PSIDP) and pushed hard to establish and professionalise the Parliamentary Development and 
Coordination Office (PDCO). 
DFID was also rather early (from 2003) in supporting the development of a parliamentary 
Strategic Investment Plan, including the restructuring of the Parliamentary Service (as distinct from 
the civil service). In addition, DFID has been supporting the Westminster Foundation for 
Democracy, which is involved in Uganda (among others countries) on strengthening human 
resources of parliament (staff development, training of parliamentarians and their staff, linkages 
with services providers, NGOs and practitioners). 
The United States (via the USAID) currently has an annual budget of approximately USD 
4.5 million dedicated to democracy and governance programming in Uganda.78 These programmes 
work with political parties, civil society, parliament, as well as local government, providing 
technical assistance and training. A small proportion of this budget is dedicated specifically to 
parliamentary activities. 
The USAID and DFID were also backing the establishment of a joint donor basket fund to 
support the parliament and reduce the donors’ transaction costs. For the programme years 2007/08 
to 2010/11, the basket-funded package of the Deepening Democracy Programme (DDP) totals in 
excess of USD 20 million.79 The programme is co-ordinated by an independent programme 
management unit, HUGGO, hosted by Danida. The partners in this programme are the UK, 
Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Netherlands, and Ireland.80 It includes support to various stakeholders 
in the elections, such as the Electoral Commission, political parties, election observers, and civil 
society groups, and parliament, leading up to the 2011 elections.  
This Deepening Democracy Programme in Uganda is comprehensive, of which about USD 
1.5 million is direct support to parliament. The parliamentary strengthening component aims in 
particular to strengthen parliament’s oversight function and its autonomy. The parliamentary 
component of the DDP focuses to some extent on the work of key oversight committees, and some 
of the expected results include more effective oversight of the executive by selected committees and 
enhanced parliamentary support services to these committees and parliamentarians. It supports the 
implementation of specified areas in the PSIDP 2007–2011.   
In addition to the DDP parliamentary strengthening component, the donors are supporting 
AWEPA with funds for its skills building programme for MPs and parliamentary staff, they are 
supporting the Ugandan Women’s Parliamentary Association (UWOPA) in skills-building on 
gender-related legislation, and the Africa Leadership Institute (AFLI) in the Parliamentary 
Scorecard Project.81 With these three elements, donors are supporting parliament with 
approximately USD 2.2 million altogether.  
Among the challenges in asserting and exercising legislative autonomy and independence, 
and in buttressing parliament’s strong and effective role in Uganda’s political system, is the balance 
and dynamics of power between the executive and legislative branches (presidential domination), 
the lack of support services to MPs, and the individual performance of MPs.  
                                                     
78 We note that the USAID is referring to “effective governance” in Uganda, not “good governance”. See for instance 
USAID webpages on Democracy and Governance in Uganda at 
www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/regions/afr/uganda.html  
79 The programme has its own website: http://ddp.ug. 
80 These are the so-called Partners for Democracy and Governance (PDG). The USAID, the UNDP, the World Bank and 
the EU are not part of the programme or the PDG, although they remain part of the wider Democratisation Working 
Group (DWG), which the USAID is currently chairing. This group coordinates and harmonises with the DDP.  
81 See www.aflia.org. 
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The DDP parliamentary component therefore works with the National Assembly (as a 
contract/programme partner to ensure more effective parliamentary oversight of the executive, to 
develop parliamentary support services (particularly policy research) and to improve parliamentary 
infrastructure (especially IT).  
The multi-donor DDP programme is hosted and supported by Danida’s Human Rights & 
Good Governance Liaison Office (HUGGO) in Kampala, and overseen by a Programme Steering 
Committee (PSC). DFID’s Governance Advisor chairs the PSC, which includes the six sponsoring 
development partners as well as eminent Ugandans who bring their insights and experiences to bear 
on the programme, and contribute to ensuring that the programme is well tuned to the Ugandan 
context. The PSC also includes representatives of the EU and the UNDP as non-voting members, in 
order to benefit from the UNDP’s experience and insights in designing and implementing 
programmes. The PSC is overseeing the DDP and takes decisions about strategy and approach and 
approves work plans, budgets and progress reports.82 
The PSC also includes representation from the Programme Management Unit (PMU). The 
PMU is responsible for the practical implementation of the DDP and its individual components. The 
PMU ensures programmatic quality and effectiveness, technical coordination, internal and external 
communication, accountability and administration, and it interacts with Ugandan stakeholders on a 
daily basis. The PMU submits quarterly reports to the PSC. The DDP has furthermore established a 
performance management system and detailed log frames for monitoring of implementation and 
results, as well as for the evaluation progress and performance.83 
The institutional set-up with the PMU reporting to the PSC seems to be functional. The fact 
that this principle is most probably going to be retained for the next phase (2011-2016) is a 
testament to that. Pending completion of the ongoing design and approval process, there will be a 
new ‘democratic governance facility’ replacing HUGGO for daily management purposes as donors 
pursue harmonisation further. Given the political sensitivity of the programme and the demands on 
PSC members, it has proved difficult to effectively fill the ‘eminent Ugandans’ positions; this 
aspect will have to be addressed in the next phase as well. 
In addition to this basket-funded programme, the USAID is supporting parliament through 
smaller components of two projects; the SUNY/CID and IRI’s project Strengthening Democratic 
Linkages in Uganda (LINKAGES) and NDI’s Common Women’s Legislative Agenda (CWLA). 
The UNDP runs a USD 200,000 Support to Parliament of Uganda project (2006–2010) to enhance 
the knowledge and expertise of MPs and staff to operate effectively in a multiparty environment. 
World Bank funding (for anti-corruption) is directed at the ‘accountability committees’ of 
Parliament, such as the Public Accounts Committee, which is chaired by the opposition.84 
Other actors include the Parliamentary Centre, the IPU, the CPA, and the World Bank 
Institute, all of which have provided capacity building and training for MPs and parliamentary staff. 
A number of parliamentary associations and NGOs have also played important roles in engaging 
parliamentarians on issues such as HIV and AIDS, people with disabilities, and the conflict in the 
north of Uganda. While there is informal coordination among the larger multilateral and bilateral 
donors, there is no formal coordination mechanism encompassing all donors, associations, and 
NGOs. Parliament, however, has a donor coordination office (PDCO). 
                                                     
82 This paragraph and the next are based on information from the programme’s website http://ddp.ug. 
83 Following the DFID format, this system gives details about baselines, targets, milestones, indicators, risks, assumptions, 
etc. at the goal, purpose and output levels. Monitoring is based on the identified indicators, for instance opinion polls if the 
indicator is ‘trust’ in a particular institution. It has proven easier to measure activities and possibly outputs, however, than 
to identify outcomes and especially impact due to the well known problems of measurement, attribution, etc. Monitoring 
is furthermore based on partner reports, narrative and financial; constant dialogue with partners; and field-level 
observation of activities. External appraisals have taken place on a yearly basis. A comprehensive end of programme 
evaluation is planned for 2011. 
84 Currently the FDC’s Nandala Mafabi, who has kept a very high profile and is more visible than the shadow cabinet. 
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3.4.3 Lessons Learnt from Uganda 
The Parliament of Uganda is only in its first multi-party period (2006–2011), and the experience in 
parliamentary strengthening is limited. However, some of the donors started supporting the 
Ugandan parliament during the one-party/no party ‘Movement’ system, and some experience has 
been gained since that period. 
For one thing, when a number of parliamentary institutions had been established (e.g. the 
Parliamentary Commissions, the Parliamentary Service and the Parliamentary Budget Office) prior 
to and immediately after the 2006 elections, the USAID and other development partners began 
turning their attention to the demand-side of governance and accountability. The rationale was that 
of balancing efforts to build the capacity of parliament as an institution with efforts to ensure that 
there was a demand from citizens, civil society organisations and political parties, for parliament to 
play an effective role in politics. By 2006, the USAID had decided that providing support for basic 
infrastructure and institutional development was no longer the best use of its resources (Tsekpo and 
Hudson 2009:17–18). 
Secondly, in addition to this shift from infrastructure and institutional development to the 
demand-side, the development partners in Uganda have been particularly careful to situate 
parliamentary strengthening within a wider programme on democracy and good governance. Thus, 
the Deepening Democracy Programme is not only embedded in the Poverty Eradication Action Plan 
and the Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy, it is also geared towards addressing the integrity of 
elections, the creation of an effective party system, enhancing civic engagement, and promoting free 
media that can strengthen accountability.  
Thirdly, the DDP has been politically bold, relevant, flexible, and ‘contextualised’ in that 
the parliamentary support component has been geared to selected committees and has worked to 
strengthen two newly established opposition institutions: the Shadow Cabinet and the Leader of the 
Opposition. The programme supports the latter two through an Expert Advisory Fund for 
Committees and a Shadow Cabinet Research Fund (PSC 2010:26). These funds make it possible to 
provide expert advice and research on technical policy issues to the opposition, and thus to sharpen 
their analysis of policies and facilitate their responses to government proposals.85  
Thus, in addition to more ‘traditional’ support elements such as the hiring of external 
technical expertise and research assistants for MPs, policy seminars for MPs, training of 
parliamentary staff, the development of a Strategic Plan, etc., this programme has been forward-
looking and mindful of the democratic needs of the country. The strategic focus on parliamentary 
committees, and in particular the strategic focus on the Shadow Cabinet and the Leader of the 
Opposition has been innovative and productive in bolstering a constructive engagement of political 
parties and particularly those in opposition in parliamentary debates.86 Working with committees 
and the Shadow Cabinet is essential to strengthening horizontal accountability between the state and 
parliament but also supporting the transition to a multi-party dispensation. 
Consequently, the principle of contextualisation seems to be well taken care of in the DDP 
programme. Besides, the principle of harmonisation is also heeded, as the DDP programme 
promotes shared goals, better information sharing, less duplication and lower transactions costs, as 
well as an agenda that extends beyond parliament to include the wider political system.  
                                                     
85 The Shadow Cabinet has a recognised status in Parliament, and so does the Leader of the Opposition. The latter has for 
instance an official vehicle on a par with ministers. The Shadow Cabinet Research Fund was discussed and agreed with 
Parliament itself, it is a budget line in the donors’ agreement with Parliament, and the PDCO administers the grant 
agreement. The Shadow Cabinet gets the money from the PDCO to fund research etc., just like the Expert Advisory funds 
for the parliamentary committees. However, so far the DDP has been handling the funds directly for technical reasons, but 
it will eventually be handed over to the PDCO. The Speaker has been generally supportive of the DDP as it is seen to 
strengthen the legislative branch rather than partisan politics. 
86 The final DDP report says that information “suggests that the support to Parliamentary Committees and the Shadow 
Cabinet has improved the quality of debate and submissions in the Parliamentary Committees and Plenary. A cited 
example includes the Shadow Finance Minister’s formal response to the Budget that is reported to have been more 
rigorous and insightful than has been the case in the past” (PSC 2010:29). 
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On the negative side, it has been noted that there is no clear government counterpart or lead 
agency of the DDP programme (beyond the parliamentary strengthening component and 
parliament’s PDCO office). “If Deepening Democracy is to be effective, Development Partners will 
need to ensure that this institutional mismatch does not lead to Government failing to engage with 
the programme” (Tsekpo and Hudson 2009:22). The development partners could for instance 
instigate the practice of providing annual DDP reports to parliament and encouraging parliament to 
hold them to account for progress made. Besides, it has been noted that some of the key 
development partners are marginal to the DDP programme (notably the USAID and the UNDP), 
and that one important element of support to Parliament is imperfectly coordinated with the rest: the 
Financial Management and Accountability Programme (FINMAP).87 
In more detail, the final DDP report “has reservations” as to the capacity building 
methodology of AWEPA, and says that short-term interventions such as exchange visits, 
workshops, and seminars are not “the most cost-effective approach for capacity development”. 
Besides, parliament is receiving support from a host of donors and it is fairly well resourced, and 
therefore the donors should examine carefully the support being given and “strengthen the focus on 
those areas of strategic importance to the realisation of programme objectives” (PSC 2010:vi-vii). 
Besides, a particular challenge to the donors in Uganda in promoting good governance is 
that so much has gone admirably right in terms of economic development, but a lot is going 
depressingly wrong in politics. On the one hand, poverty levels are going down, economic growth is 
considerable and stable, and problem areas like pollution and corruption are addressed (at least). On 
the other hand, President Museveni has become more ruthless and authoritarian.  
For instance, it is most likely that the 2011 general elections will suffer from bribery, 
intimidation and vote rigging (and possibly election violence and turmoil), leading to the re-election 
of the incumbent president and increased ruling party dominance of the next parliament. Election 
rigging is already being prepared, some journalists and media companies are being harassed, some 
private media have their licenses revoked, there is cooptation and splintering of opposition taking 
place, and the ruling party is utilising its access to state resources in its campaigning. 
This donors’ dilemma is not exclusive to Uganda. The West has long sought leaders, such 
as Museveni, who can be relied on to spend aid money well. Zenawi’s Ethiopia, Kagame’s Rwanda 
and, for a time, Obasanjo’s Nigeria have been graced with aid largesse, debt forgiveness and 
political support. Where should the balance between development and freedom lie? Can democracy 
be shoved aside in the battle against poverty? Some critics argue that aid should be conditioned on 
certain political benchmarks. Human Rights Watch, for instance, says that the donors in Uganda 
“seem unwilling to press their own governments to use assistance to address [the political] 
problems” (HRW 2009:26).  
Another challenge to donor support to the Parliament of Uganda is similar to that of many 
other developing countries: to bridge the need for parliament and MPs to be efficient and effective 
in legislation and oversight at the same time as MPs are expected to ‘deliver’ constituency service 
to their voters (the majority of whom live in poverty). 
3.5 Zambia 
Zambian politics take place in a framework of a presidential representative democratic republic, 
whereby the President of the Republic is both head of state and head of government in a multi-party 
system. The government exercises executive power, while legislative power is vested in both the 
government and parliament.88 
 In December 1990, at the end of a tumultuous year that included riots in the capital and a 
coup attempt, President Kaunda signed legislation ending his party’s (United National 
Independence Party, UNIP) monopoly on power. Growing opposition to UNIP’s power monopoly 
                                                     
87 FINMAP includes a parliamentary element alongside an extensive programme of support for financial management.  
88 The government drafts election and has wide authority to issue secondary legislation and decrees. 
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led to the rise of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), which assembled an impressive 
group of important Zambians, including prominent UNIP defectors and labour leaders. 
 In 1991, Zambia enacted a new constitution in response to growing popular demand for 
multi-party democracy, and Zambia’s first multi-party elections for parliament and the presidency 
since the 1960s were held in October 1991. The MMD candidate Frederick Chiluba resoundingly 
carried the presidential election over Kenneth Kaunda with 81 per cent of the vote. To add to the 
MMD landslide, in the parliamentary elections the MMD won 125 of the 150 elected seats and 
UNIP the remaining 25. However, UNIP swept the Eastern Province, gathering 19 of its seats there. 
 This ended the government of President Kenneth Kaunda and his one-party system of 
‘humanism’ or ‘African socialism’, which had lasted from independence in 1964. From 1991 to 
2002, Zambia was governed by President Frederick Chiluba of the ‘social-democratic’ MMD.  
Relying on the MMD’s overwhelming majority, President Chiluba pushed through constitutional 
amendments that barred former President Kaunda and other prominent opposition leaders from the 
1996 presidential elections. Consequently, Chiluba was re-elected, and the MMD won 131 of the 
150 seats in the National Assembly.  
Kaunda’s UNIP party then boycotted the parliamentary polls to protest the exclusion of its 
leader from the presidential race and an allegedly faulty voter registration exercise. Despite the 
UNIP boycott, the elections took place peacefully. Afterwards, however, several opposition parties 
and non-governmental organisations declared the elections neither free nor fair. 
In 2001, supporters of President Chiluba mounted a campaign to amend the constitution to 
enable Chiluba to seek a third term of office, but civil society, opposition parties, and many 
members of the ruling party complemented the widespread popular opposition that forced Chiluba 
to back down from his third term bid. 
Thus, in the presidential elections of December 2001, the MMD presidential candidate Levy 
Mwanawasa won by a narrow margin. Three parties submitted petitions to the High Court, 
challenging the presidential election results, but the courts decided the irregularities were not 
serious enough to change the overall result. The opposition actually won a majority of 
parliamentary seats, but subsequent by-elections gave the ruling MMD party a slim majority in 
Parliament. 
In the hotly contested 2006 elections, Mwanawasa was re-elected by a clear margin over the 
principal challengers of the Patriotic Front (PF) and the United Party for National Development 
(UPND). In mid-2008, President Mwanawasa died in office, and Vice President Rupiah Banda 
succeeded him temporarily until new elections in October 2008 gave him a narrow win to complete 
Mwanawasa’s term. The next general elections – presidential, national assembly and local – will 
take place before October 2011. 
3.5.1 Parliament of Zambia 
The unicameral National Assembly of Zambia is the country’s legislative body, based on the 
Westminster model. However, the Zambian constitution confers on the president far-reaching 
decision-making authority, which includes making all the key public appointments in the Zambian 
state; veto powers over decisions by parliament, the judiciary and local authorities; and a hand in 
the running of public companies and awarding government contracts. 
The current assembly, formed following the elections held in September 2006, has a total of 
158 members. Of these, 150 members are directly elected in single-member constituencies using the 
first-past-the-post plurality system, and the remaining eight seats are filled by means of presidential 
appointment. Members of parliament are elected for a five-year term.  
 In the assembly, a three-party constellation has predominated since the 2006 elections. The 
ruling party (presidential party) Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) has a slight majority 
only due to the eight MPs appointed by the president (it won 47 per cent of the elected seats; the 
opposition won 48 per cent). The biggest opposition party Patriotic Front (PF) has 44 seats, and the 
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United Democratic Alliance (UDA, which consists of three distinct parties89) has 27 seats. There are 
also two small parties and two independent MPs. 
 The permanent (or portfolio) committees parallel the structure of government to ensure that 
sector ministries are overseen by parliament. Still, concerns are raised about parliament’s autonomy. 
Opposition members cited the dominance of the Speaker and the ruling party in selecting committee 
members as inhibiting factors. Opposition members complained that they are not actively involved 
in planning and setting priorities. Noted is also the fact that there are no secret ballots and that the 
votes of each MP are registered, which creates pressure for party loyalty and weakens the oversight 
functions of parliament. Besides, MPs cited the dominance of the executive branch in parliament as 
an obstacle to effective participation of the opposition and the development of an independent 
parliament. All of the government’s 62 ministers and deputy ministers are MPs (IPU 2009:16). 
 However, even when the ruling party has a majority in parliament, it needs support from 
other parties to enact constitutional changes, which require a two-thirds majority. 
3.5.2 Donor Assistance to the Parliament of Zambia 
In Zambia, parliamentary support has been given through a multi-donor Parliamentary Reform 
Programme (PRP) since 2002. The Zambian National Assembly developed the programme, with the 
aim of implementing the necessary democratic reforms adopted by the Assembly, making it fully 
operational as a key instrument of multi-party democracy, and ensuring accountable and transparent 
governance. 
 The first phase of the PRP (2001–2003) was mainly a preparatory phase. The second phase 
(2003–2007) was supported by the United States, Denmark, Sweden, Ireland, and the Netherlands 
with a budget of USD 4.5 million. A key objective of the programme was to improve parliamentary 
responsiveness to and linkages between the National Assembly and the executive, MPs and their 
constituents, MPs and the general public and civil society interest groups, and between the office of 
the Speaker and the MPs regarding the management and administration of the National Assembly. 
 PRP II activities included a review of standing orders to allow for open questions; capacity-
building of staff through training in budget analysis, IT, and bill drafting; increased accessibility by 
easing the dress code and advertising committee meetings; improving civil society involvement in 
committee work like investigation, reporting and hearing; establishing a website; and parliamentary 
radio broadcasting. It also included increased media coverage; installation of modern recording 
equipment and a voting system; and support to the process of compiling parliament’s submission to 
the Constitutional Review Commission. 
 The third phase (2008–2011) involves the donors DFID, the EU, Irish Aid and the UNDP, 
with an overall value of approximately USD 9 million.90 The purpose of the third phase is to 
“increase the independence and effectiveness of the National Assembly as an agent of oversight and 
reform in Zambia”. Among the results achieved so far is the 75 per cent increase in the number of 
people having access to MPs; the 50 per cent increase in the number of visitors to parliament; the 
opportunity for the general public to follow the proceedings in the house; and the establishment of 
150 constituency offices, fully staffed and equipped (IPU 2009:14). 
 In addition, Swedish Sida supported PACT Zambia’s Parliamentary Reform project 2002–
2006. Furthermore, the multi-donor Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability 
reform programme, which is separate from the PRP, has included a component on parliamentary 
oversight. 
                                                     
89 United Party for National Development (UPND), United National Independence Party (UNIP) and Forum for 
Democracy and Development (FDD). 
90 The third phase is without the support of the USAID and the smaller donors Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands. 
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3.5.3 Lessons Learnt from Zambia 
Donor coordination is considered good in Zambia, largely because of the Joint Assistance Strategy 
for Zambia (JASZ). Twelve bilateral donors, international financing institutions, the European 
Commission and the United Nations agreed to the JASZ in April 2007.91 The Strategy emphasises 
mutual accountability of development efforts and embraces the principles of the 2005 Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. Under the JASZ, donors coordinate regularly with the 
government. At the overall level, donors work with the Ministry of Finance and National Planning; 
at the sector level, donors coordinate with respective line ministries. 
 However, there are some challenges in using the monitoring systems and indicators under 
the JASZ, which are meant to ensure that medium-term interventions in Zambia are subordinated to 
the agreed upon harmonised system.92 Besides, parliament’s engagement in the donor-government 
dialogue needs to be strengthened; the communication mechanisms that have been institutionalised 
through the JASZ framework should be opened up to include greater participation by parliament in 
critical stages of the national planning and budget cycle. 
 Some specific lessons have been mentioned from Zambia. Having both a national and an 
international advisor in the early phases of a parliamentary reform effort can be useful to provide 
different perspectives and facilitate frank discussions of what is desirable and feasible (later in the 
project their input is needed less frequently, but can still provide fresh perspectives and insights). 
Besides, to have an external implementing agency in the early stages of reform can help keep 
progress on track and hold parliament to its reform commitments. If capacity to manage funds or 
prepare reports on meeting donor requirements is lacking within a parliament, this model is feasible. 
However, an exit strategy should be designed from the outset to enable a transfer of authority as 
quickly as the local Parliament is prepared for it to avoid implementation delays (PACT Zambia 
2008:52). 
 Furthermore, a reform commitment by the Speaker is a necessary pre-condition for 
developing a fruitful parliamentary reforms project. Standing Orders revisions can serve as 
excellent benchmarks and triggers to assure that more difficult reforms take place, and constituency 
offices may serve as a carrot to encourage more difficult internal reforms. Besides, reform 
committees charged with project oversight should include a representative sample of MPs 
(including more senior members of opposition parties), and civil society must be involved with 
providing feedback on an annual basis (the failure to hold annual CSO meetings was a real loss to 
the PRP II project in Zambia) (PACT Zambia 2008:52-53). 
 Two other, inter-related political context issues have been encountered by the donors 
supporting the Parliament of Zambia. One is the dominance of the executive branch in parliament, 
which is an obstacle to effective participation of the opposition and the development of an 
independent parliament.93 The second is that the institution is getting increasingly bloated; donor 
funding has helped spark a proposal to increase the number of MPs from 150 to 280. With salaries, 
special allowances, utilities and constitutional allowances granted, the costs increases are 
substantial.94 Besides, it will further encourage and enable MPs to get involved in the 
                                                     
91 The bilaterals are: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Ireland, Sweden, the UK, and 
the USA. 
92 “When expensive and thorough survey research forms part of a project’s monitoring and evaluation plan, additional 
time and energy should be devoted to assuring maximum value from all questions asked. Indicator-related questions 
should not be dropped mid-way through a project. Research reports should directly address all project indicators and 
monitoring tools. Democracy building projects could use these reports to stimulate public debate on the reform process” 
(PACT Zambia 2008:54). 
93 Thus, it is noted that power sharing within Parliament is as important as power sharing between Parliament and the 
Executive, and therefore it should have been prioritised higher in the PRP II project (the Parliamentary Service 
Commission approach was unsuccessful, and other avenues to promote internal power sharing within the National 
Assembly should have been put forward by donors and the implementing agency (PACT Zambia 2008:53). 
94 Thus, in the next stage (PRP III), efforts should include an examination of MP allowances with an eye to encouraging 
MPs to spend more time in both constituency offices and their constituencies more generally. Besides, non-partisan 
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implementation of development projects (with may lead to further pressures of clientelism, 
favouritism, and corruption).  
3.6 Conclusion: Institutionalisation 
In conclusion, current political issues profoundly affect parliamentary strengthening. The variety of 
government types, political systems, and party systems is so great that one must customise 
approaches to the prevailing political conditions. A blueprint approach is not advisable because 
politics and parliaments are dynamic. They are moving targets that require flexible approaches, 
perceptive analyses, and continuous adjustments to the assistance strategies. When for instance 
basic parliamentary institutions are established (commissions, administrative services, etc.), it is 
time to turn attention to policy issues such as transparency, accountability, and to the demand side 
and ‘watchdogs’ of parliament. The donor focus on constitutional changes in Kenya and the 
opposition in Uganda are good examples. 
Parliamentary support can be but one element of building institutions of restraint and checks 
and balances. Political development is to some extent a question of institutional capability of public 
as well as private institutions to control and withstand the pressures for extraction (‘privatisation’ 
and usurpation of a country’s wealth and public money) and favouritism (clientelism, patronage, 
elitism). The solution to such problems lies particularly in the institutionalisation of public control 
mechanisms and in the ‘ring-fencing’ of informal practices. That is, the solution will have to include 
institutional checks and balances, free and fair elections, human rights, and horizontal and vertical 
accountability mechanisms. 
 Contextualisation also means that parliamentary strengthening must be embedded in larger 
programmes of good governance, in an agenda that extends beyond parliament to include the wider 
political system such as constitutional matters, elections, political parties, etc. The principles of 
harmonisation, alignment and contextualisation seems to be well taken care of in the Deepening 
Democracy programmes in Uganda and Tanzania, but less clearly so in Kenya and Zambia.   
 Furthermore, a strong comparative lesson is that parliamentary strengthening requires good 
working relations between the donors and the National Assembly, and preferably a strong donor 
counterpart in parliament. Therefore, most assistance efforts are now made directly with the 
parliament in question. The Ugandan Parliamentary Development and Coordination Office is a 
good example. There is room, however, for flexibility and manoeuvrability, if donors are bold and 
innovative, as demonstrated by donor support in Uganda for the opposition through the Shadow 
Cabinet and the Leader of the Opposition.  
Besides, it is necessary to establish broad political and practical support to donor efforts at 
parliamentary strengthening. Local CSOs and NGOs can be helpful in providing political support, 
as well as policy analysis and advice. The vibrant parliament-focused civil society and private 
sector community in Kenya is an example of resources upon which donors may draw.  
                                                                                                                                                                 
constituency offices can be a feasible option in an African context (it does not create an insurmountable burden, and most 
MPs willingly accept this type of structure) (PACT Zambia 2008:52–53). 
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4. Recommendations 
Despite the setbacks of the last two elections, which were marred by irregularities on Zanzibar and 
saw the ruling party increase its dominance in the Bunge/Parliament of the mainland, Tanzania 
seems to be on a positive move towards deeper democracy. 
 The Bunge has taken up more of its oversight and ‘checks and balances’ function, especially 
through the oversight committees and through an increasing number of hearings and questions. The 
Bunge seems to be gaining institutional self-esteem and increasing its powers. 
 However, in view of Parliament’s lack of financial independence and its need for further 
infrastructural improvement and human capacity (in particular the House of Representatives in 
Zanzibar), the Development Partners should continue their support. On this background, some 
recommendations can be made both for the long term (general recommendations), and for the short 
term (specific recommendations). 
4.1 General Recommendations 
From the growing literature on donor support to parliaments, a number of general lessons and 
recommendations are frequently put forward.95 Basically, the literature and manuals stresses that 
parliamentary development needs to be placed within a broader historical and social context of 
democratic development, be rendered in terms of local realities, and be focussed on the need for 
overall democratisation. In addition, it is underlined repeatedly that donor assistance to parliaments 
should be based on the precepts of the Paris Declaration, especially its principles of harmonisation, 
alignment and ownership. 
4.1.1 Adhere to the Paris Principles 
Donor assistance to parliaments will have to be based on the precepts of the Paris Declaration on 
Aid Effectiveness, especially the principles of harmonisation, alignment and ownership. This also 
applies to donor support for the Parliament of Tanzania. 
 The principle of harmonisation implies that parliamentary strengthening needs to be 
coordinated among the development partners/donors, using common arrangements and procedures, 
with each partner focussing on its areas of expertise rather than duplicating efforts. At the very 
least, harmonisation in parliamentary strengthening implies that donors begin with a clear map of 
the landscape of parliamentary strengthening before thinking about how they can best add value. 
For instance, the Sida Position Paper argues that Sida should, in line with this principle, “increase 
its participation in joint funding programmes with a comprehensive and long-term approach to 
parliamentary reform” (Sida 2006:8). 
 Besides, where appropriate, harmonisation includes forming common arrangements at 
country level for planning, funding, disbursement, monitoring, evaluation and reporting. This also 
includes an appropriate division of labour between donors according to comparative advantage. 
While development partners should work in step with one another, their approaches need not be 
uniform; there is some scope for pluralism. Sharing information and insights, reducing duplication 
                                                     
95 There is a growing academic literature on donor support to parliaments; assessments are being made, and donor agency 
reports and evaluations are produced. Also, some handbooks and manuals exist, such as the Recommended Benchmarks 
for Democratic Legislatures developed by the CPA (CPA 2000), the USAID Handbook on Legislative Strengthening 
(CDG 2000), Parliament and Democracy in the Twenty-First Century: A Guide to Good Practice (IPU 2006), 
Parliamentary Strengthening – Position Paper (Sida 2006), and Parliamentary Development: UNDP Strategy Note 
(UNDP 2009b). See also the Agora knowledge portal for a rich collection of literature (www.agora-parl.org).  
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and leaving one agency in the driver seat in local co-ordination groups is one thing, and dividing 
labour according to comparative advantage is another. 
A lot has been done on donor harmonisation and cooperation. We will emphasise the work 
on a central information system that will enable development partners to share information and 
benefit from their respective experiences through the UNDP/DFID/WBI project on a Parliamentary 
Development Knowledge Portal (Agora),96 and the role of the OECD/DAC in donor co-operation.  
Another important principle is that the respective national parliament (in recipient 
countries) should identify its own needs, not the international organisations or the donor 
community. The Paris Declaration stresses local ownership and alignment with recipient priorities; 
donor interventions must be anchored in domestic needs and demands. Parliamentary strengthening 
efforts stand a chance of succeeding only if they are based on thorough needs assessments produced 
in conjunction with the parliament concerned. 
However, parliaments are not monolithic entities speaking with one voice. The planning of 
interventions should, therefore, bring on board parliamentary permanent staff (partisan and non-
partisan), MPs, the political parties and other relevant stakeholders. The speaker and the clerk are 
key actors and need at a minimum not to be opposed to parliamentary strengthening projects; their 
active participation is a necessity.97 Furthermore, the support of various commissions, standing 
(permanent) commissions as well ad hoc commissions can be important to support, depending of 
the political landscape and the politics of the day. For instance, in countries with a relatively weak 
opposition, oversight and finance committees can be particularly important to support, and likewise 
committees where opposition presence can make a difference.98 
4.1.2 Political Sensitivity 
Support for good governance is inherently political in nature, and very sensitive. Bilateral donor 
agencies – not only the agencies of former colonial powers but also the major players on the global 
scene – could easily be suspected of having ulterior motives, e.g. promoting specific models or 
advancing foreign policy positions. Their interventions might be perceived to be politically 
motivated. Three lessons are related to this, with emerging practices meant to diffuse some of the 
political sensitivity and ensure effectiveness. 
 The first is that peer advice is generally more acceptable than donor guidance. 
Consequently, the involvement of fellow parliamentarians from other countries through 
parliamentary associations may be helpful. A regional approach to parliamentary strengthening is 
based on the idea that peer-to-peer knowledge transfers and shared experiences are more likely to 
‘sink in’ than international (read: Western) experiences and standards. For instance, the Sida 
position paper and thematic review favoured an expansion of the range of support to parliamentary 
networks to include local and regional networks (Sida 2006:7, 9; Hubli and Schmidt 2005:6–8). 
 Secondly, issue-based approaches can be useful entry points, especially in hostile 
environments. Parliaments deal with a range of policy areas and parliamentarians are often in dire 
need of information and technical knowledge about these. Donors have experienced that training 
programmes addressing substantive issues – as distinct from procedural or institutional reform – 
have been useful entry points and met with approval, even enthusiasm. Such substantive issues or 
themes could cover anything across the board of parliamentary work, e.g. gender relations; HIV and 
AIDS; environmental protection; climate change; women inclusion and participation, etc. Issue-
based approaches can serve to bridge party divides and promote inter-party consensus on important 
                                                     
96 See: www.agora-parl.org. 
97 This was demonstrated in Tanzania between 2003 and 2005, when the Speaker of the Union Parliament, Pius Msekwa, 
was an impediment to reform, but with the election of Samuel Sitta as Speaker the reform agenda gained momentum. 
98 It has also been noted that there is weak absorptive capacity by the parliamentary staff. In the past this was evidenced by 
tardiness and resistance to major reforms, which could not be pushed through unless staff believed that there would be 
individual, personal gain from them.  
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policy matters, and can build trust and pave the way for other types of intervention, which might be 
considered more sensitive. 
 Third, parliament support through multilateral agencies and basket funding is often seen as 
less intrusive and non-political than single-donor interventions. Support through the UNDP, in 
particular, and through concerted co-operative multi-donor projects and programmes are therefore 
on the increase. These programmes cannot easily be criticised for pursuing agendas at variance with 
the wishes of the countries concerned. Also programme-based approaches (PBAs) can defuse some 
political sensitivity and resistance because they share some basic features. They provide leadership 
by the host country or organisation; a single comprehensive programme and budget framework; a 
formalised process for donor co-ordination and harmonisation of donor procedures for reporting, 
budgeting, financial management and procurement; and efforts to increase the use of local systems 
for programme design and implementation, financial management, monitoring and evaluation.99 
 Some observers have maintained, however, that some of these approaches may have a 
downside. Although the UNDP may have a comparative advantage in de-sensitising parliamentary 
support, it may not be as efficient in its operations as bilateral agencies. Basket funding and 
programme based approaches can likewise become over-coordinated, bureaucratised and inflexible. 
4.2 Specific Recommendations 
In addition to the general recommendations above, some short-term, specific recommendations on 
parliamentary support can be made for the DPs in Tanzania. The first three are on focus; given the 
Tanzanian political-economy context certain priorities stand out as to what functions of parliament 
need to be strengthened. The other three recommendations relate to the modalities of multi-donor 
parliament support in Tanzania, given the Tanzanian context and the comparative lessons.  
At the same time, the moral and political value of continued support is perhaps the most 
important aspect of international support for Tanzania’s parliament. Some observers have argued 
that the Parliament of Tanzania, and in particular the Union Parliament is sufficiently funded and 
sufficiently equipped in technical terms, so that the donors could shift their attention in the next 
phase to transparency, accountability, and checks and balances. 
4.2.1 Strengthen the Opposition 
In Tanzania, we have seen a gradual weakening of the opposition in terms of the decreasing number 
of opposition party MPs in the Union Parliament. It has been reduced from 20 per cent in 1995 to 
13 per cent in 2000 and 11 per cent in 2005. The Union Parliament nevertheless retains a ‘Leader of 
the Opposition’ and a ‘Shadow Government’. 
Against this background, and given the pivotal role of the opposition in any parliament (it 
has been said that the opposition is the ‘watchdog of the watchdogs’), it is important that the DPs 
consider rendering some support specifically earmarked for the opposition in Tanzania. In the case 
of the Union Parliament, this can be done by rendering support (financial and/or technical) to the 
Leader of the Opposition, and to the Shadow Government. This can be done by for instance the 
same mechanism as in Uganda, a Shadow Cabinet Research Fund, or as direct support to the Office 
of the Leader of the Opposition and the shadow government. Anyway, it will have to be formally 
approved by the Speaker’s Office, but it should be possible.100 
 In the Zanzibar House of Representatives the proportion of opposition MPs is much larger, 
and has remained high (48 per cent in 1995, 36 per cent in 2000 and 38 per cent in 2005). Besides, 
                                                     
99 This is the definition of PBAs according to the Paris Declaration (OECD 2005). 
100 Resistance will come from the ruling party (CCM Central Committee, some prominent politicians, and local level 
CCM dignitaries). However, targeted support for the Office of the leader of the Opposition was politically possible in 
Uganda, where the ‘political climate’ is harsher than in Tanzania. Besides, as noted in one interview, “the current ruling 
party should accept and endorse this, because next time they could well be the beneficiaries.” 
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the CUF opposition has been the only existing opposition in the House, which means the opposition 
is exceptionally united (a de facto two-party system). On the other hand, the recent referendum and 
the union government that will follow are likely to reduce the opposition in the Zanzibar House of 
Representatives to zero.  
Thus, the opposition in Zanzibar can only be reached indirectly. One way is by supporting 
the opposition of the Union Parliament, as described above, and the other is by supporting one of 
the main platforms of the opposition: the oversight and scrutiny committees (see below).  
Besides, the principle of a comprehensive approach becomes even more important when the 
opposition is weak (or co-opted, as is the case in Zanzibar). Parliamentary opposition depends on a 
host of factors outside parliament itself. No efficient parliamentary opposition is likely without 
reasonably strong political parties. If individual political parties function poorly in terms of interest 
articulation, policy formulation, nomination of candidates, internal democracy, representation, 
election campaigning, etc., the party system and the parliament is also likely to suffer from serious 
shortcomings. The electoral system and electoral process also affects the strengths of the opposition. 
Thus, the components of the DDTP programme and other efforts of support for the political parties 
and the electoral process become essential parts of parliamentary strengthening.101 
4.2.2 Strengthen the Oversight Committees 
In Tanzania, we have seen that key oversight committees are led by opposition MPs. With or 
without this quality (it varies from one country to another), the parliamentary committees of 
oversight, scrutiny and control are important to support. In Tanzania, these include the accounts 
committees (the committees of Public Accounts, Public Corporation Accounts, and Local 
Government Accounts), but can also include other oversight committees such the committees of 
Finance and Economic Affairs, Constitutional, Legal and Public Administration, and Parliamentary 
Privileges, Ethics and Powers.102  
 Committees are often called the workhorses of parliament, and the management of their 
meetings, the documents they consider, hearings to attend, and often their travel can be a time-
consuming task. A support programme could work directly with the committees to enhance 
committee member’s understanding of current issues through knowledge transfer, capacity building, 
and training.103 In particular, the oversight function and the legislative function (passing of laws and 
the budget) need strengthening. Open meetings and public discussions (that include relevant NGOs, 
CSOs, and regional/international expertise) is one way to institutionalise these skills. 
In this area, the DPs can support the development of a committee secretariat and support 
research and committee management skill development, assist in the establishment of committee 
hearings or public forums, and assist the committees with assessment missions and research trips. 
A support programme could also work with committee staff to improve their capacity to 
draft reports and conduct analyses aimed at improving MP understanding of committee work. These 
may include adoption of tools for the standardisation of committee reports and automation and 
standardisation of other routine processes; to collect and present information, research capacity 
and legal services. 
 Donors can also support the creation and ongoing work of key parliamentary committees on 
sectoral issues. Some examples of areas where parliamentary committees or parliamentary 
                                                     
101 In particular the DDTP components on Political Parties and on the Election Management Bodies and the Electoral 
Process, but also other efforts such as the UNDP Election Support Project, the NIMD programme on political party 
support and the Political Party Act, and a host of other projects. Both political party and election support can be geared 
towards the specific needs of the opposition. 
102 The relevant Zanzibar House of Representatives committees are the Public Account Committee for Ministries and 
Public Corporations (PAC), the committee for Finance and Economy, and the Ethics Committee. 
103 The most popular method of training committees is probably through sessions where trainers (preferably legislators 
who have headed committees in other countries) present the important and varied roles of committees in their own 
systems. 
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secretariats should be involved include budgeting and economic planning, the Millennium 
Development Goals, etc. It can also include processes to gauge MPs needs, and develop 
recommendations aimed at improving oversight practices such as the format of question and answer 
sessions. 
 Besides, support can be rendered to parliamentary commissions of inquiry and 
investigation, whenever needed. These are usually ad hoc parliamentary committees or 
commissions formed to carry out in-depth investigations into specific issues of public importance. 
Such commissions usually benefit from a greater degree of access to information than normal 
committees. They may need support to summon witnesses and hold hearings, to request documents 
and information, to organise field visits, and more. 
 Certain conditions will have to be met in order to successfully strengthen the oversight 
committees.104 For one thing, the project should be clearly formulated and agreed upon by the 
parties involved (and as always, the Speaker and the Clerk are key actors and need to be favourable 
to the idea, and their active support would be preferable). Secondly, it needs to be flexible to meet 
present-day needs. 
One possible vehicle for a committee support project would be to establish a fund on the 
Ugandan model, where the donors have institutionalised an Expert Advisory Fund for Committees. 
Besides, there should be a steering committee comprising a variety of interests represented in 
parliament, together with donor agency representatives and preferably also the presence of relevant 
government agencies (e.g. the Auditor General) and some NGOs and CSOs. 
4.2.3 Stem the Resource Curse Tendencies 
In light of the likely prospect that Tanzania will become an oil and gas producer and exporter in a 
few years time, there is a specific need to prevent resource curse tendencies in the country. The 
corruption pressure will intensify manifold. Parliament is a pivotal institution in this respect and by 
engaging effectively in the policy cycle, with partners meeting their responsibilities too, parliaments 
and parliamentarians can do much to ensure that Tanzania’s resources – including the aid provided 
by donors – are spent effectively in pursuit of the country’s developmental priorities. 
 In particular, in order to stem resource curse tendencies in Tanzania, there is a need to 
promote economic diversification (support the productive sectors, especially manufacture and 
agriculture), and to ensure a fair distribution of the revenues (reduce inequalities and poverty, and 
curb corruption, embezzlement, capital flight, and waste).  
 The role of parliament in this is manifold. There is a need for parliament to establish and 
reform the legal framework (jurisdiction and authority over the territory, adopt international 
standards and conventions on anti-corruption, integrate anti-corruption principles into national 
legislation, and consolidate various criminal laws dealing with corruption). There is also a need to 
establish norms and regulations of the petroleum sector (a comprehensive petroleum policy, set 
standards for environment, health and labour safety, define and establish ‘local content’ policies, 
etc.), and to establish and refurbish institutions (such as the national state oil company, savings and 
stabilisation funds, and the auditor general). 
 Financial accountability mechanisms are, however, most crucial in order to stem the 
resource curse tendencies. An over-arching issue for the Parliament of Tanzania is to establish a 
sound budget process.105 This includes setting priorities (on revenues and expenditures), simplifying 
                                                     
104 DFID’s parliamentary strengthening work in Bangladesh is perhaps the clearest example of failure. This project ran 
from 2001 until 2005 and had a budget of GBP 2 million to strengthen the role and capacity of parliamentary committees. 
The UNDP was the lead agency, tasked to coordinate and manage the pooled funds. There was much delay, and little 
progress was made. Indeed the project completion report suggested that this was “an example of how not to approach 
strengthening parliamentary committees”. Divergent understandings of the project were identified as the primary reason 
for its failure (Hudson & Wren 2007:40). 
105 According to IBP ”Tanzania’s score on the Open Budget Index shows that the government provides the public with 
minimal information on the central government’s budget and financial activities during the course of the budget year. This 
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and disseminating budget information, and keeping track of revenues and expenditures. To that end, 
the DPs can work with finance and public accounts committee members and staff to determine how 
to best improve the budgetary understanding of all parliamentarians and staff. Establishing a non-
partisan economic review unit within the secretariat can also be part of the activities on budgetary 
oversight. Other components of include activities to support budget hearings and mechanisms for 
inputs on the budget process. 
 In Tanzania, there might also be a need for a Parliamentary Budget Office; a non-partisan 
body to produce objective budgetary, fiscal and programmatic information for legislators.106 Its role 
can include participation in the drafting, approval, implementation and auditing of the national 
budget. The case for a budget office rests on the assumption that legislatures need a source of 
information and analysis independent from the executive to effectively execute its legislative and 
oversight functions (Straussman and Renoni 2009:1). The experience has been relatively good in 
Uganda, where this office was instituted by the USAID. 
 Certain conditions must be met, however. For one thing, donors and implementers should 
require that staff is explicitly non-partisan and committed to doing objective, independent analysis. 
To bolster the image of impartiality further, the office should ideally be located separate from the 
legislature building and the information produced by the budget office should serve all political 
parties in the legislature.107 Furthermore, the office should be established as a permanent institution 
with a specific mandate and core functions, and pay levels of staff should reflect those paid to 
experts in comparable professional capacities (Straussman and Renoni 2009:9-10).  
4.2.4 Choose the Better Donor Modalities 
We have seen some general tendencies in donor support to parliaments; there has for instance been 
a shift from infrastructure support and issue-based support to support for parliaments’ checks and 
balances and other political functions. We have also seen that donors have become increasingly 
explicit in their good governance agenda, and increasingly bold in, for instance, supporting 
oversight committees and the opposition, more or less directly.  
We have also seen a difference in preferred contract partner or project implementing 
agency. It seems that Norway prefers IGOs, whereas CIDA and Sida seem to prefer INGOs/NGOs 
and particularly international parliamentary organisations. The USAID differs significantly from the 
other donors by not using IGOs (inter-governmental organisations such as the UNDP and other UN 
agencies) as executing agencies, but rather private and even for-profit, private companies (academic 
institutions and consultancy firms) (Tostensen and Amundsen 2010:101).  
However, the choice of donor modality in parliamentary strengthening should not just be a 
case of donor ‘preferences’ and ‘international trends’, but be based on needs and efficiency 
considerations in each country context. Some indicators as to what modality to choose is found in 
the principles (for instance in the Paris Declaration, contextualisation, and long time horizons) and 
in lessons generated from country experiences. 
There are two extreme (ideal, non-existent) modalities of donor intervention, which can be 
called the donor-led and recipient-led models, respectively, each with its advantages and drawbacks. 
The first is when the donors demonstrate substantial political will, moral leadership, and internal 
agreement, and externally speak with one voice. In this case the donors are willing to call upon 
                                                                                                                                                                 
makes it difficult for citizens to hold government accountable for its management of the public’s money” (IBP website 
http://openbudgetindex.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=2433&hd=1). See Appendix 2, table 2.  
106 In addition to an independent budget office, legislatures can have at least two additional ways to enhance budget 
oversight, the Public Accounts Committees (PACs, of which Tanzania is well bestowed) and parliamentary research 
institutes (which does not exist in Tanzania). PACs, however, differ fundamentally from budget offices because they are 
inherently partisan bodies comprised of MPs with political affiliations instead of objective, independent budget office 
analysts. 
107 In Kenya, for example, public officials face serious legal repercussions if they do not respond to information requested 
by the parliamentary budget office. 
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NGOs, media, civil society organisations and other stakeholders to form pro-change alliances, and 
they are sometimes willing to use economic inducements and conditionality to see implemented 
what they see as necessary reforms. This is the case when there is a need for a strong push for 
political reform in a harsh political climate with strong resistance from vested local interests. 
In Tanzania, there is a need for some donor-led advocacy in order to stem the tendencies of 
ruling party dominance, presidentialism, lack of checks and balances, and a weak parliament with 
restricted opportunities for the opposition. The advantage of this model is that resistance to reforms 
can be overcome and programmes can be effectuated. The drawback is the lack of local ownership 
and alignment, and the attendant danger that the recipient may pull out and close the entire 
programme. 
The second model of donor intervention is the recipient-led model, in which the donors 
respond to local needs and demands. It is suitable when parliamentary assistance primarily responds 
to the needs expressed in parliament’s own corporate plans and requests for assistance, and leaves it 
to the recipient to make the priorities. The advantage is strong local ownership. The danger is that it 
depends on the recipient’s own control system, as in the case with budget support, and that this aid 
is liable to succumbing to political pressure, feed into partisan and clientelist structures, nurture 
cronyism and favouritism, and lead to the opposite of checks and balances and sound budget 
management.108   
Any realistic model for parliamentary support is somewhere in-between, in order to forestall 
the dangers posed by either extreme. In principle, there can be more or less coherent and stringent 
organisation at both the recipient and the donor side. On the recipient side, there can in Tanzania be 
a need to strengthen the ‘recipient’ capability, as we have seen was the case (and done) in Uganda 
with the Parliamentary Development and Coordination Office.109   
On the donor side, a large number of organisational models are possible. Donor co-
ordination can be more or less loose (varying from basket funded ad hoc institutionalised projects) 
to long-lasting, formalised programmes on multiple governance issues like the DDTP in Tanzania 
and DDP in Uganda. 
In the middle, between the donor agencies and the recipient parliaments, there can be a 
multitude of intermediary programme implementing/executing agencies. We have seen preferences 
ranging from IGOs to INGOs and NGOs, to international parliamentary organisations, academic 
institutions, and consultancy firms. Each of these has its advantages and drawbacks. 
To our knowledge, only the USAID uses private, for-profit consultancy companies as 
implementing organisations for some of their development projects.110 On the other hand, non-profit 
academic institutions and ‘international’ NGOs (including parliamentary organisations and 
networks and party foundations) are used rather often. The advantage of having academic 
institutions and INGOs implement projects is evident: expertise and efficiency.  
The drawback is that every organisation carries a backpack of reputation, skills, and 
networks that are not always neutral; most organisations have a national origin and a distinct 
‘nationality’ despite their efforts of becoming truly ‘international’. SUNY/CID and IFES are 
distinctly American, the Westminster Foundation is definitely British, the Parliamentary Center is 
Canadian, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung is German, etc., for good and for bad. It is for good when the 
common national background of the organisation and the (lead) donor agency means closer control 
and better follow-up. It is for bad when this leads to national (home-country) interests and policies 
(allegedly) being pursued.    
                                                     
108 We have seen the idea expressed in Zambia of increasing the number of MPs by 87 per cent, and the recent decision by 
the parliament in Nigeria to increase the House of Representatives remuneration to about NGN 180 million per year per 
member (approximately USD 1.2 million) plus allowances, ‘constituency outreach and development’ funds, and other 
benefits.  
109 In parallel, the NIMD has for instance managed to establish official recipient organisations for Dutch party support in 
countries like Kenya (Centre for Multiparty Democracy CMD-K) and Bolivia (Fundación Boliviana para la Democracia 
Multipartidaria, FBDM). See: http://www.nimd.org/page/home. 
110 For-profit implementers are probably as difficult to accept for most bilateral donors as basket funding is to the USAID. 
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The Kenya example has shown that the use of the academic/consultancy organisation 
SUNY/CID has been quite successful and the organisation seems to be respected by the recipients. 
Also in Uganda, the USAID through SUNY/CID was instrumental in the establishment of the 
independent Parliamentary Budget Office, before the DDP programme was established. The USAID 
has also been a key player in further supporting the oversight committees and the Shadow Cabinet 
and the Leader of the Opposition. In Tanzania, however, problems were encountered with the same 
organisation (leading to its contract not being renewed), and it is still regarded with some 
scepticism. The success or failure is by some accounts more dependent on the directorship and the 
status of the lead agency (the USAID in the case of SUNY/CID) than on the capacities of the 
organisation itself. 
In other words, with the USAID as a lead donor (in monetary and/or political terms), 
parliamentary strengthening programmes have in some cases moved beyond the traditional 
approach. In Tanzania, the USAID is probably the biggest and most influential donor in the field, 
but the USAID has no role in the DDTP programme. Even with a stronger co-ordination and 
harmonisation between the USAID and the other donors of the DDTP programme, it is not probable 
that the USAID can (and will) play the same pro-active and political role as in Uganda and Kenya.  
In addition to international NGOs, parliamentary strengthening programmes have also been 
administered, managed and implemented by multinational governmental organisations, such as the 
UNDP and the World Bank (but to our knowledge not by the EC). The advantages of the UNDP are 
that it has a particularly long history of parliamentary support, a very competent and experienced 
home office staff, and a range of institutional partners to draw upon. Besides, it is definitely an 
advantage that the UNDP is a multinational organisation that cannot be suspected of pursuing 
particular national or political interest. 
The drawback of the UNDP also stems from its multinational nature. As a multinational 
organisation it is very oriented towards consensus, and therefore it follows a middle track, and has 
been accused of lacking ‘political clout’. As a large international organisation, it has also been 
criticised for being slow and bureaucratic, with a long chain of command leading to delay, tardiness 
and interruption in programme implementation.  
The DDTP programme, including the parliamentary support component, has seen a lack of 
following up, lack of a responsible co-ordinator for prolonged periods, late disbursements of 
money, and frustrations both on the side of the DPs and the implementing partners.  
However, the UNDP enjoys great esteem among institutions and officials in Tanzania 
despite these weaknesses, and the legitimacy of the UNDP (and the entire UN system) in Tanzania 
is not in doubt. The Tanzanian government perceives the UNDP to be a neutral partner not pursuing 
any particular donor country or UN member country agenda, and in the sensitive area of 
parliamentary support, the UNDP is “particularly sensitive to political sensitivities”.111 The UNDP 
has come to stay and will soon invite the DPs to support its new parliamentary strengthening 
programme, and this should be met positively. 
Besides, for the sake of credibility and long-term commitment, the DPs should maintain (at 
least part of) its support for parliament in Tanzania through the UNDP, for legitimacy and 
ownership purposes. The UNDP can and should be maintained as a project administrator and 
implementer primarily for the long-term, recipient-led infrastructure developments (as set out in the 
corporate plans) and basic skills enhancement (the Sisyphean task). 
However, with the reorganisation of the UN mission activities in Tanzania into the new and 
pilot ‘One UN’, which carries some uncertainties as to the modalities of the UN’s work, the DPs 
will have to follow the UNDP and the ‘One UN’ development closely, and conditions have to be 
set. One set of conditions has to do with the UNDP providing the proper staffing and competence 
on parliamentary support. The current responsible person seems to have adequate background and 
                                                     
111 The embracing of the UNDP by certain decision-makers in Tanzania can also be interpreted in a negative vein; the 
UNDP is relatively ‘weak’ and ‘sensitivity’ could mean willingness to be pushed in the direction of the wishes of recipient 
and implementing agencies.  
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experience, and this kind of project management knowledge and excellence will have to be 
maintained within the UNDP. Another set of conditions has to do with the UNDP’s programme 
management. The UNDP will have to manage the finances better, to follow up on planned 
activities, and to ensure planned and timely disbursements. 
Thus, the DPs support for the Tanzanian parliament through the UNDP should be partial, 
and should focus on the basic functions of parliament. That is, further support for infrastructure 
improvements (offices, office equipment, computers, vehicles, constituency offices, etc.) should be 
the main component of DP support through the UNDP, together with the repeated basic training for 
skills enhancement of new members (the Sisyphean task).  
This will leave room (including responsibility and funds) for the DPs to develop forms of 
support more specifically targeting parliament’s political roles. The DPs in Tanzania should opt for 
a more flexible and directly donor-led approach for the politically more sensitive issues such as 
strengthening the opposition and stemming resource curse tendencies (with a main focus on budget 
transparency). These sensitive issues will need a more direct dialogue, more flexibility to adapt to 
changing circumstances (e.g. the coalition government in Zanzibar), and sometimes more ‘leverage’ 
exercised by the DPs in concert with their diplomatic personnel.  
Some propositions for political support has been mentioned above: to establish a Shadow 
Cabinet Research Fund, to support the Office of the Leader of the Opposition, and other 
mechanisms for direct, targeted support for the opposition, an Expert Advisory Fund for 
Committees and other oversight and ad hoc scrutiny committees, and a Parliamentary Budget 
Office. All this will have to be done in concert with other stakeholders (forming alliances with the 
media, CSOs, NGOs, government agencies, research institutes, etc.), and coordinated with other 
efforts towards supporting the electoral process and the political parties. 
However, with the current donor structure in Tanzania in mind (the aid dependency 
problem, which also means that the donors depend on a capable recipient, the lack of political clout 
among certain donors, in particular the multinational ones, and the USAID outside of the DDTP 
structure), certain conditions will have to be med for this donor-led approach to be successful. Most 
important is a minimum standard for what the donors can accept in terms of non-democratic 
developments, resistance, and setbacks. Furthermore, a donor-internal dialogue comprehensive 
enough to make the DPs speak with one voice and pursue the same goals. 
4.2.5 Strengthen the DPs Parliamentary Support Capacity 
Parliamentary strengthening can only be achieved through patient and painstaking work over the 
long run. It should be recalled that electoral cycles are typically 4–5 years, and the duration of an 
intervention over two electoral cycles would be justified, perhaps even three or more. A long-term 
intervention can allow for the flexibility that a moving target demands. 
 Continuity of personnel is crucial in the implementation of parliamentary assistance 
programmes, because they involve building relationships based on trust, which can only be 
achieved in the long term. While MPs come and go, parliamentary staff are normally employed on a 
permanent basis and could thus provide continuity. It is a major problem, however, that the turnover 
of donor personnel is high, which undermines both continuity and institutional memory.
 Development partners’ human resource policies and processes are essential in this respect. 
The pool of donor expertise and experience in parliamentary strengthening is relatively small (only 
the USAID has a full-time agency expert on parliamentary assistance in Tanzania). As 
parliamentary strengthening moves up the international development agenda, the quality of 
parliamentary strengthening work should not be compromised. Development partners must ensure 
that they have sufficient numbers of staff in post with the right skills, professional background and 
inter-personal qualities to operate effectively in a parliamentary environment (AAPPG 2008:45).  
 It is also a perennial problem in donor agencies that the institutional memory and learning is 
weak because of a high turnover of staff. Therefore, there is a need for establishing workable 
systems of institutional memory, learning and knowledge storage and retrieval. A system of 
CMI REPORT DONOR SUPPORT TO PARLIAMENTS – TANZANIA AND BEYOND R 2010:8 
 47
knowledge storage and retrieval should be established to ensure easy access to and quick 
dissemination of knowledge in the field of parliamentary assistance to relevant project and advisory 
staff.  
The Parliamentary Development Knowledge Portal Agora can and should be used actively 
by all DPs in Tanzania, but some additional form of local knowledge storage and retrieval system 
should be developed further. Updated websites with relevant documents, quarterly newsletters, 
analyses and assessments, plus a restricted area for invited officials for the more sensitive 
documents and discussions, should be operated by the intermediary implementing organisation (in 
this case the UNDP) at a relatively low cost. 
 A few other methods can also be used to redress some of these weaknesses. Firstly, most 
agencies will have locally employed staff, who usually has lower turn-over rates than the expatriates 
and a better understanding of local contexts. The capacity, skills, and responsibilities of these 
people can be enhanced in some of the agencies. Secondly, the DPs monitoring and following up 
projects can be selected with an emphasis on skills for financial management, managing for results, 
sector dialogue, etc. Thirdly, the intermediary project/programme implementing agencies 
(government agencies, IGOs, INGOs, NGOs, parliamentary organisations, academic institutions, 
and consultancy firms), which usually have permanent staff can also employ better skilled, more 
experienced, and more specialised staff. All of this depends on DP priorities, however; the 
necessary enhancements can be made if required by programme contracts and the ToR, and the 
funds and staff made available for programme administration. 
4.2.6 Managing for Results 
Finally, in terms of the harmonisation of parliamentary support in Tanzania, there is room for 
improvement. The overall management structure with the presence of relatively ‘like-minded’ 
development partners in an oversight committee is a robust structure, even if a Programme 
Coordination Office (PCO, currently the UNDP Tanzania) is managing the programme on a day-to-
day basis. It is quite similar to the management structure chosen by the donors in Zambia, and 
allows for oversight, strategic guidance, and flexibility.  
 
Much is expected of the Deepening Democracy programme; it seems eminently 
sensible to have parliamentary support as one component of a wider and well-
integrated programme of assistance for governance. However, putting all one’s eggs in 
one basket, or all of one’s money through a basket fund, does entail some risks and 
will require regular and systematic reviews (Tsekpo and Hudson 2009:vii). 
 
Besides, progress on monitoring parliamentary performance or the impact of parliamentary 
strengthening has been slow. There was a mid-term evaluation (UNDP 2009a) of the entire DDTP 
programme, but it gave limited advice as to the modalities and strategies of door support to the 
Bunge and the HRZ. If the DPs and Parliament are to enhance the effectiveness of their 
collaboration, they must work together to learn the lessons from successes and failures. Progress 
requires that the DPs carry out systematic research and analysis about the effectiveness of 
parliamentary strengthening along a number of indicators. Some of these are governance indicators 
(such as those of the WGI), the number of laws passed and questions asked, the openness of the 
budget process (e.g. the IBP’s Open Budget Index), etc. These are but indicators; a systematic 
performance audit would also include context, purpose, and other qualitative assessments. There is 
no doubt that parliamentary strengthening requires a good understanding of the political terrain. 
 
In Tanzania, a country that has a long history of one-party rule and executive 
dominance, it will take a sustained effort from Development Partners and from 
Parliament itself to build a Parliament that is an effective and independent player in the 
country’s system of governance (Tsekpo and Hudson 2009:viii).  
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A2 Tables 
 
Table one: 
Overview of donor support to parliaments in Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya and Zambia 
 
Country Overall 
programme 
Parliament 
support 
programme 
Years Development   
partners 
Sums USD 
overall 
programme 
and parlia. 
component 
Lead 
donor 
Programme 
implementer 
Tanzania Deepening 
Democracy in 
Tanzania 
Programme 
National 
Assembly Fund 
07 - 10 Norway, Sweden, 
DK, NL, Ireland, 
Canada, EC, 
UNDP 
12,600,000
?
DK UNDP 
Uganda Deepening 
Democracy 
Programme 
Oversight & 
Autonomy of 
Parliament 
08 - 11 DFID, Norway, 
Sweden, DK, NL, 
Ireland 
20,000,000
1,500,000
DFID HUGGO (DK) 
Kenya  Parliamentary 
Strengthening 
Programme III 
05 - 10 USAID, DFID 
8,500,000
USAID SUNY/CID 
Zambia  Parliamentary 
Reform 
Programme 
08 - 11 DFID, EU, 
Ireland, UNDP 9,000,000
DFID UNDP 
 
 
 
Table two:  
Open Budget Index scores for Tanzania 2008 
Source: http://www.openbudgetindex.org/ 
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This report presents an analysis of 
the Parliament of Tanzania (which 
includes the Bunge in Dodoma and the 
House of Representatives in Zanzibar), 
which has only recently taken up its 
‘checks and balances’ functions. The 
report proceeds to outline the multi-
donor parliament support rendered to the Tanzanian parliament, and to the 
parliaments of Zambia, Kenya, and Uganda, in order to compare and contrast 
the strengths and weaknesses of the different aid modalities. Based on general 
lessons, on the analysis of the Tanzanian parliament, and the comparative/
contrasting cases of Zambia, Kenya, and Uganda, the report concludes on a 
set of recommendations for the development partners for future multi-donor 
assistance to the Tanzanian Parliament. 
